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REVOKING WILLS
David Horton*
No issue in inheritance law has sparked as much debate as the requirements for
making a valid will. For centuries, Anglo-American courts have insisted that decedents
obey rigid formalities, such as signing or acknowledging their wills before two witnesses.
These rituals preserve proof of the testator’s wishes, reinforce the gravity of estate
planning, prevent fraud and duress, and distinguish wills from other instruments.
But they also have a dark side. In scores of cases, judges have cited minor errors during
the execution process to invalidate documents that a decedent intended to be effective.
Accordingly, generations of scholars have critiqued will-creation doctrine. Recently,
these discussions have intensified, as several jurisdictions have embraced the harmless
error rule, which excuses trivial departures from the execution formalities, or adopted
statutes that validate electronic wills.
However, the well-canvased topic of creating a will has a little-noticed flip side.
Testators do not merely need to follow formalities to make a will; rather, they also must
jump through hoops to un-make a will. Since the British Parliament passed the Statute
of Frauds in 1677, there have only been two ways to annul a testamentary instrument:
by burning, tearing, canceling, or obliterating the document or by signing another will.
In sharp contrast to the extensive commentary on executing wills, revocation doctrine
has never received sustained attention.
This Article fills that vacuum. First, it reveals that the revocation formalities
defeat testamentary intent far more often than is commonly believed. Indeed, testators
fail to achieve their goals when they destroy a photocopy, deface the margins of their
will, leave the room while a third party revokes the instrument, or express their wishes
in a writing that is not a full-fledged will. Thus, even more than the execution
formalities, revocation doctrine consists of tripwires and traps for the unwary. Second,
the Article demonstrates that the benefits of these merciless rules are minimal. Although
some serve the same evidentiary, ritual, protective, and channeling functions as the
execution formalities, others further no discernable goal. Third, the Article critiques
potential solutions to these problems. It explains that a handful of lawmakers and
courts have moved in the right direction by relaxing the revocation formalities,
extending harmless error into this sphere, and achieving justice in particular cases
through the imposition of a constructive trust. Nevertheless, the Article also contends
that these curative measures do not go far enough. Accordingly, the Article proposes a
novel path forward: importing the revocation formalities from trust law. In sharp
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contrast to the straitjacket of wills doctrine, trust law both permits settlors to revoke their
trusts by any reasonable means and to create their own private revocatory rules. Thus,
extending this lenient approach into the realm of wills would minimize intent-defeating
outcomes, dovetail with broader trends in the field, and bring revocation law into the
twenty-first century.
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, an Illinois resident named Tyler Brewer decided to
revoke his will. 1 This instrument, which Brewer had signed in 1999,
gave most of his assets to his brother, making only a gift of jewelry to
his young daughter, Hannah. 2 But as the years passed, Brewer had
grown closer to Hannah and also fathered a son, Jourdan. 3 Thus, in
2012, as death approached, Brewer decided that his will was outdated.
Because he could not find the original document, he marked up a
1 See Brewer v. Brewer (In re Estate of Brewer), 35 N.E.3d 149, 150 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
2 See Will of Tyler Brewer, at *1, *3–4 [hereinafter Brewer Will], Brewer v. Brewer (In
re Estate of Brewer), No. 2013 P 387 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Mar. 11, 2014), aff’d, 35 N.E. 3d 149
(on file with author).
3 See id.; Brewer, 35 N.E.3d at 150.
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copy, crossing out one provision, adding Jourdan’s name to the section
that identified his family, and handwriting on the first page: “[A]s of
9/22/12 [t]his will is [v]oid. I am working on a [n]ew one that
[i]ncludes [b]oth Hannah and Jourdan[.] TB.”4
FIGURE 1: WILL OF TYLER BREWER

4

Brewer Will, supra note 2, at *1.
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In 2015, Jaime Marks, a soldier who was stationed at West Point,
New York, signed a will leaving her condo and house to her husband,
Marcelino Morales, Jr. 5 However, two years later, her marriage
deteriorated. 6 As a result, Marks scrawled “VOID” at the top of her
will’s cover page and added “[e]verything will be left to my three
daughters: Jessica, Emily, and Erica Marks ONLY!!!” 7 She then signed
and dated below the notation. 8
FIGURE 2: LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF JAIME D. MARKS

5 See Last Will and Testament of Jaime D. Marks at *1 [hereinafter Marks Will], In re
Estate of Kranz-Marks, No. 2019-6, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 50646(U) (Sur. Ct. Mar. 10, 2020)
(Westlaw) (on file with author); In re Estate of Kranz-Marks, No. 2019-6, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op.
50646(U), at *1 (Sur. Ct. Mar. 10, 2020) (Westlaw).
6 See Marks Will, supra note 5, at cover page (expressing Marks’s wish to disinherit
Morales).
7 Id.
8 Id.
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In 2016, Nadya Elis, who lived in Maryland, hired a lawyer to help
her cancel all her previous wills.9 In front of two witnesses and a notary,
Elis signed a writing entitled “Revocation of Will,” which stated that
she wanted to “revoke, terminate, abrogate, nullify, tear apart, destroy,
and declare completely null and void any and all wills, codicils, and
bequests made by me.”10
FIGURE 3: NADYA V. ELIS REVOCATION OF WILL

9 Kiknadze v. Elis, No. 1166, 2020 WL 4937994, at *1–2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 24,
2020).
10 Id. at *1–2.
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These cases highlight an important but neglected problem in
inheritance law. For decades, no issue in the field has provoked as
much controversy as the steps necessary to create a valid will. In AngloAmerican legal systems, executing a will takes place in the shadow of
the Wills Act: a nineteenth-century statute that requires wills to be
written, signed by the testator, and attested by two witnesses who were
present at the same time when they saw the testator sign or ratify the
document. 11 In addition, about half of U.S. jurisdictions recognize
holographic wills, which do not need witnesses but must be in the
testator’s handwriting and signed by her. 12 Traditionally, courts
demanded strict compliance with these rules, voiding would-be wills
for trivial errors, such as a misplaced signature, 13 witnesses who were
not in the same physical space when the testator acknowledged the
document, 14 or a stray typed word in a purported holograph. 15
These doctrines, which I will call the “execution formalities,” have
captured the attention of generations of scholars. For instance, in
separate articles published in 1941, Ashbel Gulliver and Catherine
Tilson (writing together), and Lon Fuller (working alone) contended
that each element of the Wills Act furthers a key goal. 16 By insisting
upon a signed and witnessed writing, the statute preserves proof of the
testator’s wishes (the “evidentiary function”), reinforces the gravity of
the process (the “ritual function”), discourages fraud and forgery (the
“protective function”), and distinguishes wills from other legal
instruments (the “channeling function”). 17 As later writers then
elaborated, these external badges of authenticity minimize the “worst
evidence problem”: the fact that inheritance law hinges on the wishes
of a decedent, who cannot “clarify his declarations, which may have

11 See Wills Act 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26 (Eng., Wales & Ir.).
12 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2503 (2021); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6111(a) (West
2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4 (2021); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 256.154 (West 2021); VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.2-403 (2021); David Horton, Wills Law on the Ground, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1094,
1116 n.139 (2015) (collecting statutes).
13 See, e.g., In re Schiele’s Estate, 51 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. 1951).
14 See, e.g., In re Groffman [1969] 1 WLR 733 (P) at 739 (Eng.).
15 See, e.g., In re Thorn’s Estate, 192 P. 19, 22 (Cal. 1920).
16 See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51
YALE L.J. 1, 5–9 (1941); Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800
(1941).
17 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 16, at 5–13 (discussing the evidentiary, ritual, and
protective functions); Fuller, supra note 16, at 800–03 (referring to the evidentiary,
cautionary, and channeling functions). Although Gulliver and Tilson focused on the Wills
Act, Fuller largely concentrated on the contract doctrine of consideration. See Gulliver &
Tilson, supra note 16, at 5–13; Fuller, supra note 16, at 799–804.
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been made years, even decades past.” 18 In addition, because millions
of people die every year, bright-line rules “enable probate courts to
identify documents as wills solely on the basis of readily ascertainable
formal criteria, thereby permitting probate to proceed in the vast
majority of cases as a routine, bureaucratic process.” 19
But near the end of the twentieth century, a new cohort of
academics offered a more skeptical account of traditional willexecution doctrine. Some of these critics argued that the Wills Act and
holograph statutes had not kept pace with the times. 20 As they
observed, in a movement called the “nonprobate revolution,” owners
were transmitting wealth through devices that are exempt from the
execution formalities, such as inter vivos revocable trusts. 21 Compared
to these user-friendly mechanisms—which do not need to be witnessed
and can even be consummated orally—the steps necessary to create a
will seemed excessive. 22 Similarly, a chorus of critics asserted that the
practice of ignoring the testator’s desires and refusing to enforce
attempted wills for trivial mistakes was “inequitable,”23 “needless,” 24
and an “anachronism.” 25 Thus, “‘[d]own with formalism’ [became]
the rallying cry of probate reform.” 26
This debate has intensified as the law has evolved. Over the past
three decades, calls to reform the execution formalities have gained
traction. The 1990 revisions to the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), the
Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers,
and twelve American jurisdictions have adopted a novel rule called
harmless error, which allows judges to enforce a writing that does not
satisfy the execution formalities if the decedent clearly meant it to be
her will. 27 In addition, since 2017, nine states have sought to bring will
18 John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful
Interference with Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 335, 344 (2013) (quoting John H. Langbein,
Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 492 (1975)).
19 Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1033, 1036 (1994).
20 See, e.g., James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L.
REV. 541, 557 (1990).
21 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of
Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108, 1113 (1984) (describing how contract-like
mechanisms were replacing wills as the primary estate planning tool).
22 See, e.g., Wehking v. Wehking, 516 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Kan. 1973) (“the validity of a
trust in personalty established by parol has long been recognized”).
23 Lindgren, supra note 20, at 542.
24 Langbein, supra note 18, at 489.
25 Id. at 496.
26 Mann, supra note 19, at 1033.
27 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (AM. L. INST. 1999); CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 6110(c)(2) (West 2021); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-503 (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-
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making into the digital age by passing statutes that authorize electronic
wills. 28 These developments have inspired a vibrant new literature
about the future of estate planning. 29
But despite the attention lavished on the creation of wills, the
revocation of wills has flown underneath the radar. Since the British
Parliament passed the Statute of Frauds in 1677, there have only been
two ways to annul a testamentary instrument. 30 First, a testator can
perform a “revocatory act” by burning, canceling, tearing, or
obliterating the will with the intent to revoke it. 31 Second, a person
can rescind a will by executing a writing that satisfies the rules that
govern the making of a will. 32 This avenue—“revocation by will”—rests
on the premise that because wills are formal documents, only an
equally formal writing should be able to defeat them. 33 Surprisingly,
even though these “revocation formalities” are the mirror image of the
much-discussed execution formalities, academics have generally
ignored them. 34
503 (2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2503 (2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (2021);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.24 (West 2021); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-503 (West 2021); VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.2-404 (2021); cf. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-503 (2021) (enacting harmless error as part
of a temporary COVID-19 relief measure).
28 Five of these laws follow unique approaches to electronic will formalities. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2518 (2021); FLA. STAT. § 732.522 (2021); IND. CODE § 29-1-21-4
(2021); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-102 (West 2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085
(2019). Four have passed the Uniform Law Commission’s proposed Electronic Wills Act.
See UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019) [hereinafter UEWA]; COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 15-11-1301 (2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-37 (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1405
(West 2021); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.12.400–11.12.491 (2021).
29 See, e.g., Natalie M. Banta, Electronic Wills and Digital Assets: Reassessing Formality in
the Digital Age, 71 BAYLOR L. REV. 547 (2019); Bridget J. Crawford, Blockchain Wills, 95 IND.
L.J. 735 (2020); Bridget J. Crawford, Wills Formalities in the Twenty-First Century, 2019 WIS. L.
REV. 269; Adam J. Hirsch, Technology Adrift: In Search of A Role for Electronic Wills, 61 B.C. L.
REV. 827 (2020); David Horton, Wills Without Signatures, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1623, 1635 (2019);
David Horton, Partial Harmless Error for Wills: Evidence from California, 103 IOWA L. REV. 2027
(2018); John H. Langbein, Absorbing South Australia’s Wills Act Dispensing Power in the United
States: Emulation, Resistance, Expansion, 38 ADEL. L. REV. 1 (2017); Peter T. Wendel, Wills Act
Compliance and the Harmless Error Approach: Flawed Narrative Equals Flawed Analysis?, 95 OR.
L. REV. 337 (2017); Gökalp Y. Gürer, Note, No Paper? No Problem: Ushering in Electronic Wills
Through California’s “Harmless Error” Provision, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1955 (2016); Paige
Hall, Note, Welcoming E-Wills into the Mainstream: The Digital Communication of Testamentary
Intent, 20 NEV. L.J. 339 (2019).
30 See Statute of Frauds 1677, 29 Car. 2 c. 3 (Eng.).
31 See id. § 6.
32 See id.
33 See Allen v. Huff, 9 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 404, 411 (1830).
34 One exception is Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal Revocation:
Manifestations of Probate’s Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 411 (2009). Glover
argues that the relative ease with which a testator can revoke a will by act “promotes
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This Article reassesses the law of will revocation. It has four goals.
First, the Article reveals that the revocation formalities do more
damage to testamentary intent than is commonly believed. The
problem is not just that courts demand literal compliance with the
revocation formalities. It is that judges have embellished these
commands with an additional layer of technicalities. For example,
each of the testators mentioned above failed to revoke their wills.
Although Tyler Brewer handwrote “[t]his will is void” on a Xerox of
the document, an Illinois appellate court held that “a revocatory act
performed on a[] photocopy is legally ineffective.”35 Likewise, a New
York Surrogate Court concluded that Jaime Marks’s notation in the
margins of her original will did not “physically obliterate it” and
therefore “[wa]s insufficient to operate as a revocation [by act].” 36
Furthermore, Brewer’s and Marks’s handwritten, signed—but
unwitnessed—expressions of intent were not proper revocations by
“will,” because neither of their states recognizes holographic wills. 37
Finally, and even more perversely, Nadya Elis’s lawyer-drafted, signed,
witnessed, and notarized writing was nothing more than words on a
page. 38 It was not a revocation by “act” because it was printed on a
separate piece of paper, rather than a “‘cancel[ation]’ . . . performed
on the will.”39 Moreover, it was not a revocation by “will” since
Maryland is one of several jurisdictions that only allow testators to
revoke wills through writings that also dispose of some of their assets. 40

probate’s family-protection policy by channeling a decedent’s estate into intestacy.” Id. at
413 (footnote omitted) (citing JESSE DUKEMINIER, STANLEY M. JOHANSON, ROBERT H.
SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES (7th ed. 2005)). Conversely, this
Article focuses more on the difficulty of revoking a will: situations in which a testator almost
certainly intended to annul an instrument but failed to do so. Likewise, another piece on
revocation, Robert Whitman, Revocation and Revival: An Analysis of the 1990 Revision of the
Uniform Probate Code and Suggestions for the Future, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1035 (1992), claims “that
relatively few cases presenting revocation . . . problems arise in the system.” Id. at 1036.
Although I agree that there is probably less litigation over revocation than the creation of
wills, the issue does generate a fair number of disputes. See infra Parts II–III.
35 Brewer v. Brewer (In re Estate of Brewer), 35 N.E.3d 149, 153 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
36 In re Estate of Kranz-Marks, No. 2019-6, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 50646(U), at *2 (Sur.
Ct. Mar. 10, 2020) (Westlaw).
37 See Brewer, 35 N.E.3d at 152–53 (declining to even consider whether Brewer revoked
his will by making a second will); Kranz-Marks, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 50646(U), at *2
(explaining that Marks’s handwritten passage failed to be a will because it “was not executed
with the formalities required by statute”).
38 See Kiknadze v. Elis, No. 1166, 2020 WL 4937994, at *5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 24,
2020).
39 Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-105(b)(2) (West 2020) (previously
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-105(2) (West 2019))).
40 See id.
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These cases are not unique; indeed, revocation law often generates
absurd results.
Second, the Article questions the value of these unforgiving
revocation rules. Upon close inspection, these principles lack the
virtues of the execution formalities. As noted, scholars agree that the
Wills Act serves evidentiary, ritual, protective, and channeling
functions. 41 Conversely, revocation doctrine is riddled with nuances
that are hard to justify. For example, even if mandating that testators
deface an original will deters forgery, this logic does not apply to cases
like Tyler Brewer’s, where the testator’s penmanship demonstrates
that the revocation is authentic. Even worse, ignoring language written
in the margins (as with Jaime Marks’s will) or requiring revocations by
“will” to contain bequests (the downfall of Nadya Elis’s attempted
revocation) serve no discernable policy objective. Thus, the hallmark
revocation doctrine is not merely formalism—it is empty formalism.
Third, the Article explains why electronic wills are going to
exacerbate these problems. These cutting-edge testamentary instruments are sending policymakers back to the drawing board because
several established methods of revoking paper wills, such as burning
and tearing them, do not apply to intangible writings. Not surprisingly,
then, the jurisdictions that have adopted e-will statutes have taken
divergent approaches to revocation. 42
Fourth, the Article evaluates potential cures for the pathologies of
revocation. It explains that a slim minority of courts and policymakers
have taken a step in the right direction by liberalizing revocation law.
For example, some judges have imposed a constructive trust on the
estate for the benefit of the individuals who would have inherited if the
revocation had been effective. 43 Likewise, the UPC loosens the rules
for revoking by act and extends harmless error to some failed
revocations. 44 The Article endorses these remedial measures, which,
unfortunately, have not been widely adopted. But the Article also
demonstrates that they contain gaping holes. Thus, the Article
proposes a novel solution: aligning will revocation law with the rules
that govern the revocation of a trust. The Article explains why this
change would reduce unfair outcomes, avoid difficult questions about
revoking electronic wills, and modernize the centuries-old will
revocation formalities.
A few words can clarify the scope of this Article. The revocation
of wills is a sprawling issue that intersects with several other complex
doctrines. However, the Article focuses on the oft-litigated issue of
41
42
43
44

See supra text accompanying notes 16–17.
See infra subsection II.B.4.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
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how testators can voluntarily cancel wills in their entirety. As a result,
it excludes related topics, such as implied revocations triggered by
divorce, 45 partial revocations by act, 46 and the revival of revoked wills. 47
The Article contains four Parts. Part I sets the stage by describing
the debate over the execution formalities. It shows that although the
caselaw interpreting the Wills Act and holograph statutes is infamous
for its wooden rules and harsh results, this legacy of formalism has
started to wane. Part II then pivots to will revocation. It reveals that
the rules that govern this subject are confusing and counterintuitive.
Part III contends that the costs of these revocation formalities dwarf
the benefits. Indeed, some revocation requirements further vital policies, but others are baffling. Finally, Part IV analyzes existing attempts
to reform revocation law and ultimately suggests that lawmakers
borrow revocation rules from the field of trusts.
I.

MAKING WILLS

To frame the issue of will revocation, it can be helpful to start with
an overview of will execution. This Part explains that the steps required to create a testamentary instrument have sparked decades of
controversy. It then reveals that the rigidity of traditional will-creation
law is slowly relaxing its grip.
A. Formalism’s Rise
The law of will execution has long been synonymous with “harsh
and relentless formalism.” 48 This section explains why.
Historically, three British statutes have dominated the will-making
process. First, in 1540, Parliament passed the Statute of Wills. 49 At
common law, land—the wellspring of economic power—could not be
45 In general, “[t]he dissolution of the testator’s marriage is a change in circumstance
that presumptively revokes any provision in the testator’s will in favor of his or her former
spouse.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1(b)
(AM. L. INST. 1999); see also Naomi R. Cahn, Revisiting Revocation upon Divorce?, 103 IOWA L.
REV. 1879, 1881 (2018) (criticizing this rule).
46 A partial revocation by act occurs when the testator tries to cancel a specific part of
the will rather than the entire instrument. See Note, Partial Revocation of Wills by Acts Done
to the Instrument, 23 HARV. L. REV. 558, 559 (1910). States disagree about the permissibility
of this practice. See, e.g., In re Estate of Menchel, No. 263251, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 50930(U),
at *2 (Sur. Ct. May 18, 2006) (Westlaw).
47 Revival comes into play when the testator makes Will 1, then revokes Will 1 by
making Will 2, and then revokes Will 2. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-509 (UNIF. L. COMM’N
2019). The question in revival cases is whether the testator intended to reinstitute Will 1 by
revoking Will 2. See id.
48 Langbein, supra note 18, at 489.
49 See Statute of Wills 1540, 32 Hen. 8 c. 1 (Eng.).
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devised, 50 and testators often disposed of personal property on their
deathbeds through oral “nuncupative” wills. 51 The Statute of Wills
changed these traditions by making real estate transmissible by
testamentary instrument so long as the owner memorialized her wishes
in writing. 52
Second, in 1677, lawmakers added a layer of formality by enacting
the Statute of Frauds. 53 A year earlier, the Great Fire had swept
through London, destroying property records and making “the effect
and even existence of wills . . . sources of dispute.” 54 Thus, section 5 of
the new law declared that wills transmitting land “shall be in [writing]
and signed by the [testator] . . . and shall be attested and subscribed in
the presence of the [testator] by three or [four] credible
[w]itnesses.” 55 These formalities distinguished wills from contracts
and gifts, which can sometimes be made orally and never need to be
attested by witnesses. 56
Third, in 1837, the Wills Act extended the rigorous execution
formalities to bequests of both real and personal property. 57 In
addition, the Wills Act reduced the number of required witnesses to
two but specified that these people must be “present at the same
[t]ime” when the testator either signed the document or
acknowledged her signature. 58 Both the Statute of Frauds and the
Wills Act eventually migrated to former British colonies, such as
Australia and the United States. 59

See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430; 1 HENRY SWINBURNE, A TREATISE
12, 14, pt. 4 § 26 (7th ed., Dublin, Elizabeth Lynch
1793) (1590).
51 See 3 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 539 (3d ed. 1923).
52 See Statute of Wills 1540 § 1.
53 Statute of Frauds 1677, 29 Car. 2 c. 3 (Eng.).
54 Philip Hamburger, The Conveyancing Purposes of the Statute of Frauds, 27 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 354, 364–66 (1983).
55 Statute of Frauds 1677 § 5.
56 For example, the Statute of Frauds only covered specific kinds of agreements, such
as those that could not be fully performed within a year of their making. See Statute of
Frauds 1677 § 4. In addition, the law required these deals to be in writing and signed by
the party to be charged, but did not insist upon witness attestation. See id.
57 See Wills Act 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26 (Eng., Wales & Ir.)).
58 See id. § 9.
59 See, e.g., Waller v. Waller, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 454, 475 (1845) (noting that Virginia
had recently adopted the Wills Act); LAW REFORM COMM. OF S. AUSTL., TWENTY-EIGHTH
REPORT OF THE LAW REFORM COMMITTEE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA TO THE ATTORNEYGENERAL: RELATING TO THE REFORM OF THE LAW ON INTESTACY AND WILLS 10–12 (1974)
(analyzing the execution formalities in South Australia).
50

OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS pt. 1 §§
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In addition, about half of American states adopted holographic
will statutes. 60 Holographs, which have deep roots in civil law countries, are exempt from the Wills Act’s attestation requirement but must
be handwritten and signed by the testator. 61 The rationale for this
deviation from the Wills Act is that because each person’s penmanship
is distinctive, a decedent’s handwriting “assume[s] the role witnesses
normally serve[.]” 62
In the middle of the twentieth century, scholars who specialized
in private law became intrigued by the execution formalities. In 1941,
Ashbel Gulliver and Catherine Tilson (in one article) and Lon Fuller
(in another) critiqued the statute’s elements. 63 Gulliver and Tilson
began by noting that probate litigation takes place in an unusual
posture: because the testator will be dead, the court must discern her
intent through the haze of testimony from interested parties and
documents that may be very old. 64 Accordingly, Gulliver and Tilson
argued that the Wills Act’s writing and signature requirements serve
an “evidentiary” function: they ensure that a decedent’s wishes are
“cast in reliable and permanent form.”65
In addition, Gulliver, Tilson, and Fuller observed that the
execution formalities reinforce the gravity of estate planning. Wills are
“ambulatory” and can be revoked at any time. 66 In turn, this power to
erase and revise creates a risk that testators will make rash decisions.
Thus, the three authors observed that the elaborate rites of the Wills
Act “act[] as a check against inconsiderate action.” 67 Gulliver and

60 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2503 (2021); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6111(a) (West
2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4 (2021); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 256.154 (West 2021); VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.2-403(B) (2021); Horton, supra note 12, at 1116 n.139 (collecting statutes).
61 See Reginald Parker, History of the Holograph Testament in the Civil Law, 3 JURIST 1, 4–
5, 5–10, 28–31 (1943) (describing the evolution of holographs). States disagree about how
much of the instrument needs to be handwritten. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(b) & cmt.
(UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019) (“[A] holograph may be valid even though immaterial parts such
as date or introductory wording are printed, typed, or stamped.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1999) (describing
this jurisdictional split).
62 Stephen Clowney, In Their Own Hand: An Analysis of Holographic Wills and Homemade
Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 27, 33 (2008); see Adams’ Ex’x v. Beaumont, 10
S.W.2d 1106, 1108 (Ky. 1928) (reasoning that every person “acquires a style of writing, a
certain mannerism in the formation of letters and words, absolutely peculiar to himself, and
which, almost without exception, renders his handwriting easily distinguishable from that
of others”).
63 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 16; Fuller, supra note 16.
64 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 16, at 6.
65 Id.
66 Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Is It Time for Irrevocable Wills?, 53 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 393,
393 & n.4 (2016); see Cozzort v. Cunningham, 130 S.E.2d 171, 173 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963).
67 Fuller, supra note 16, at 800; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 16, at 5.
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Tilson dubbed this the “ritual function,” while Fuller called it the
“cautionary function.”68
Next, Gulliver and Tilson theorized that attestation by witnesses
once played a “protective” function by shielding testators from fraud
and undue influence. 69 However, they argued that this goal was no
longer relevant because although “wills were [once] usually executed
on the death bed,” they were now “probably executed by most testators
in the prime of life and in the presence of attorneys.” 70
Finally, Fuller mentioned what he called the “channeling
function.” 71 As he put it, the Wills Act elements “furnish[] a simple
and external test of enforceability” by standardizing the appearance of
testamentary instruments. 72 Indeed, when a judge sees a signed and
witnessed writing, she can be confident that it is a will. 73
But even though the execution formalities were socially valuable,
they also had a dark side. Courts adopted “[a] strict interpretation of
the Wills Act,”74 citing minor deviations from its commands to nullify
documents that decedents “doubtless[ly] intended to be [their] last
will.”75 People failed to create a will every time they forgot to sign the
instrument 76 or authenticated it in the wrong place, 77 or when a witness
could not see the decedent put pen to paper, 78 or when the witnesses
were not “present at the same time” when the testator gave her
approval to the document. 79 Judges also used an iron-handed
approach when assessing purported holographs. If someone typewrote, printed, or stamped a single word, she violated the axiom that
“a holographic will not entirely written by the testator cannot be
probated.”80

68 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 16, at 5; Fuller, supra note 16, at 800, 814.
69 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 16, at 9–13.
70 Id. at 10.
71 Fuller, supra note 16, at 801–03.
72 Id. at 801.
73 See id.
74 Armenti v. Ryan, 186 A. 517, 517 (N.J. Dep’t of Lab., Workmen’s Comp. Bureau
1936).
75 In re Sage, 107 A. 445, 445 (N.J. 1919).
76 See, e.g., In re Hoyt, 303 So. 2d 189 (La. Ct. App. 1974); In re Estate of Glace, 196
A.2d 297, 300 (Pa. 1964).
77 See, e.g., In re Schiele’s Estate, 51 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. 1951).
78 See In re Mackay’s Will, 18 N.E. 433, 434 (N.Y. 1888); Krause v. Dodge (In re Krause’s
Estate), 117 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1941).
79 In re Groffman [1969] 1 WLR 733 (P) at 739 (Eng.).
80 Maris v. Adams, 166 S.W. 475, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914), modified, 213 S.W. 622
(Tex. Comm’n App. 1919); cf. In re Estate of Dobson, 708 P.2d 422, 424 (Wyo. 1985)
(refusing to enforce an attempted holograph that the decedent had handwritten which also
contained a third party’s notations because it was not “entirely in the handwriting of the
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In these ways, the fact that a decedent wanted a “document to be
his or her will has always been secondary to whether or not the
document complied with the statutory formalities.” 81 But as I discuss
next, this legacy has started to evolve.
B. Formalism’s Decline
Recently, the execution formalities have become embattled. As
this section explains, states have started to experiment with fresh
approaches to will creation.
In the late twentieth century, scholars became disenchanted with
orthodox will-creation doctrine. This shift stemmed, in part, from a
sea change in legal practice. In 1965, Norman F. Dacey’s How to Avoid
Probate! became a surprise best-seller and christened the “nonprobate
revolution”: a movement in which people went to great lengths to
avoid leaving property that was subject to court supervision after
death. 82 Pay-on-death accounts and revocable trusts became the core
of many estate plans. 83 Although these devices are “will substitutes”—
they allow owners to pass wealth after death—they do not need to
comply with the Wills Act or holograph statutes. 84 Instead, these
mechanisms are often governed by private formalities established by
financial firms that manage a decedent’s assets, such as banks or trust
companies. 85 In turn, these institutions generally insist that nonprobate transfers be written and signed, but not attested. 86 Thus,

testator” (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-55 (1957) (current version at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6113 (West 2021)))).
81 Mann, supra note 19, at 1035.
82 Langbein, supra note 21, at 1108 (coining the phrase “nonprobate revolution”); see
NORMAN F. DACEY, HOW TO AVOID PROBATE! (HarperCollins 5th ed. 1993) (1965); Edwin
McDowell, Book Notes, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/07
/arts/book-notes-459190.html [https://perma.cc/D8RW-BG6E] (describing the wild
success of Dacey’s book).
83 Langbein, supra note 21, at 1109.
84 Id. (“In truth, will substitutes are simply ‘nonprobate wills’—‘wills’ that need not
comply with the Wills Act.”). To be clear, some courts did strike down purported trusts on
the grounds that they were “testamentary” and thus needed to obey the Wills Act. See, e.g.,
Betker v. Nalley, 140 F.2d 171, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1944). But those cases were soon overruled.
See, e.g., Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600, 605 (Ill. 1955) (refusing to find that “intended
trusts [were] invalid as attempted testamentary dispositions”).
85 See Lindgren, supra note 20, at 556 (explaining that “financial intermediaries have
developed these will substitutes as free-market competitors to the state-run probate
system”).
86 See id. at 557.
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critics like James Lindgren urged lawmakers to mirror this practice by
deleting the witnessing mandate from the Wills Act. 87
Similarly, in a forceful critique, John Langbein challenged the
judicial norm of requiring strict compliance with the Wills Act. 88
Langbein began by noting that there is nothing unusual about
subjecting the enforceability of a legal instrument to formal requirements. 89 After all, the fields of contracts and property also demand
that certain transfers be reduced to a signed writing or supported by
consideration. 90 But Langbein observed that these rules differed in
one critical way from wills law. Courts had carved out exceptions—for
instance, part performance and promissory estoppel—which
recognized that “when the purposes of the formal requirements are
proved to have been served, literal compliance with the formalities
themselves is no longer necessary.”91 Conversely, wills doctrine alone
insisted “that any defect in compl[iance] . . . automatically and
inevitably voids the will.”92 For these reasons, Langbein contended
that judges should interpret the Wills Act purposively, rather than
textually, and ask whether the goals of the formalities had been
satisfied. 93
But the most influential development began in an unlikely place.
In 1975, the South Australian Parliament adopted a novel statute that
allowed probate judges to forgive “technical failure[s] to comply with
the Wills Act” if they were “satisfied that [a] document does in fact
represent the last will and testament of the testator.” 94 Shortly
thereafter, Langbein abandoned his substantial compliance proposal
and endorsed the South Australia regime, which he called the
“harmless error rule.” 95 The 1990 revisions to the Uniform Probate
Code (UPC) and the Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers

87 See id. (“The main purpose of the attestation requirement is to protect the testator
against fraud, duress, and undue influence. Yet we know from experience with will
substitutes that witnessing isn’t necessary to prevent these harms.”).
88 See Langbein, supra note 18, at 489.
89 See id. at 498–99.
90 See id. at 498–99; see also Langbein, supra note 21, at 1133.
91 Langbein, supra note 18, at 499.
92 Id. at 498.
93 Id. at 516–26.
94 LAW REFORM COMM. OF S. AUSTL., TWENTY-EIGHTH REPORT OF THE LAW REFORM
COMMITTEE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA TO THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: RELATING TO THE REFORM
OF THE LAW ON INTESTACY AND WILLS 10–11 (1974) (describing what became Wills Act
Amendment Act (No. 2) 1975 (S. Austl.) s 9 (Austl.), amending Wills Act 1936 (S. Austl.) s 12).
95 See John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on
Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 51 (1987).
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echoed Langbein’s call. 96 Since then, twelve U.S. jurisdictions have
given courts the discretion to validate writings that violate the
execution formalities if there is compelling proof that the decedent
intended to make a will:
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not
executed in compliance with [the Wills Act], the document or
writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that
[Act] if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by
clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the
document or writing to constitute . . . the decedent’s will . . . . 97

Thus, the harmless error rule has become the “most significant change
in what constitutes a will since enactment of the Statute of Frauds.” 98
Finally, an equally momentous transformation is now underway:
the rise of electronic wills. Since 2017, Arizona, 99 Florida, 100 Indiana, 101
and Nevada 102 have adopted statutes that authorize wills in digital
formats. 103 These laws are the fruits of lobbying by legal services
96 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS app. I items 3–4 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 13, 1990)
(expanding on 1989’s Tentative Draft No. 12).
97 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (AM. L. INST. 1999) (“A harmless error in executing a will may
be excused if the proponent establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent
adopted the document as his or her will.”). Hawaii, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey,
Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah have adopted UPC section 2-503 verbatim. See HAW. REV.
STAT. § 560:2-503 (2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2503 (2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2523 (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 2021); OR. REV. STAT § 112.238 (2019); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-503 (West 2021). In 2020,
Minnesota followed suit temporarily to facilitate will-making during the coronavirus
pandemic. See MINN. STAT. § 524.2-503 (2021) (“This section applies to documents and
writings executed on or after March 13, 2020, but before February 15, 2021.”). Finally,
California, Colorado, Ohio, and Virginia have embraced “partial” harmless error statutes
that can only excuse failure to comply with some elements of the Wills Act (usually
attestation). See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(c)(2) (West 2021); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-503
(2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.24 (West 2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404 (2021).
98 Mann, supra note 19, at 1035.
99 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2518 (2021).
100 See FLA. STAT. § 732.522 (2021).
101 See IND. CODE § 29-1-21-4 (2021).
102 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2019). In 2001, Nevada became the first state to
authorize electronic wills. See id.; David Horton, Tomorrow’s Inheritance: The Frontiers of Estate
Planning Formalism, 58 B.C. L. REV. 539, 568 (2017). But “the software necessary to meet
the requirements of the statute ha[d] not yet been developed,” so it was almost never used.
Gerry W. Beyer & Claire G. Hargrove, Digital Wills: Has the Time Come for Wills to Join the
Digital Revolution?, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 865, 887 (2007).
103 In addition, courts have sometimes upheld electronic wills. See In re Estate of
Horton, 925 N.W.2d 207, 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018) (per curiam) (using the harmless error
rule to enforce a will written on cell phone); In re Estate of Castro, No. 2013ES00140, 2013
WL 12411558 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June 19, 2013) (enforcing a will written with stylus and
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providers such as LegalZoom and Willing.com. 104 Their goal is to
create a market for supervising will execution over the internet and
then serving as “qualified custodians” who store the document for an
extra fee. 105 As a result, these “industry-drafted” statutes generally
make it easier to probate an e-will that has been lodged with a
custodian. 106 Conversely, in 2019, the Uniform Law Commission
promulgated a rival Uniform Electronic Wills Act (UEWA). 107 This
proposed law tries not to favor any “particular business model” and
thus does not mention qualified custodians. 108 As of the summer of
2021, Colorado, North Dakota, Utah, and Washington have adopted
the UEWA. 109 Thus, it may only be a matter of time before testators
routinely articulate their wishes in emails, text messages, and word
processing files.
*

*

*

To summarize, there has been a long and lively debate about will
creation. Although the execution formalities were once notorious for
thwarting a decedent’s intent, they have gradually become more
flexible. Nevertheless, as the next Part elucidates, the related topic of
will revocation has slipped through the cracks.

saved on tablet computer). As these cases reveal, in some states, a digital document may
qualify as a “writing” that is “signed” even without an electronic will statute. See Horton,
supra note 102, at 568–69.
104 See Hirsch, supra note 29, at 859 (discussing the lobbying efforts that have produced
some e-will statutes).
105 See Developments in the Law: More Data, More Problems, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1790, 1806
n.87 (2018).
106 Memorandum from Suzanne Brown Walsh, Chair, Unif. L. Comm’n, Turney P.
Berry, Vice Chair, Unif. L. Comm’n & Susan N. Gary, Reporter, Unif. L. Comm’n, to Unif.
L. Comm’n 3 (June 8, 2018), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System
/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=442fc3a6-ba53-f1db-fce6-c52d81340e0c
&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/5R93-LN82] (describing these laws as “industrydrafted”). Three of the statutes encourage the use of qualified custodians by making wills
stored with such a person or entity “self-proving,” which means that a court can admit them
to probate without the need for the submission of evidence. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 142519(2) (2021); FLA. STAT. §§ 732.503, 732.523 (2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086 (2019).
107 See UEWA, supra note 28.
108 Id. at 2. Instead, the UEWA permits testators to make e-wills self-proving by
including an affidavit sworn “before an officer authorized to administer oaths under law of
the state in which execution occurs.” Id. at 16.
109 See supra note 28.
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Unlike the Wills Act and holograph statutes, the rules for revoking
wills have lurked in relative obscurity. This Part gives them the
attention they deserve.
A. Early Law
The common law did not impose rigid mandates on the
revocation of wills. 110 Instead, the inquiry was fact-sensitive and
holistic. Judges asked whether there was “clear evidence of a positive
declaration of the intent to revoke.” 111 Testators could satisfy this
standard through oral statements or unsigned and unattested writings. 112 Even after Parliament began to solemnize the law of will
execution by passing the Statute of Wills in 1540, a testamentary
instrument that “must have been in writing . . . [could] have been
revoked by parol.” 113
But in 1676, the King’s Bench decided Cole v. Mordaunt—a case
that would transform the law of revocation. 114 The testator had
executed a written will making a large gift to charity. 115 His wife, who
was much younger, then alleged that he had orally revoked this
instrument on his deathbed and made a nuncupative will leaving his
entire estate to her. 116 Nine people claimed to have witnessed this
exchange. 117 Eventually, however, this testimony was exposed as perjury. 118 When the truth emerged, one of the judges, Lord Nottingham,

110 See WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS 273 (1901)
(observing that “the form of the revoc[ation] . . . was immaterial”). This was a looser
standard than Roman law, which insisted that testators revoke wills that were less than ten
years old by performing “some act” that demonstrated their intent to revoke. WILLIAM L.
BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION TO MODERN LAW 610–11
(1938).
111 Floyd v. Floyd, 34 S.C.L. (3 Strob.) 44, 55 (S.C. Ct. App. 1848).
112 See, e.g., Brook v. Warde (1572) 73 Eng. Rep. 702, 702–03; 3 Dyer 310 b, 310 b
(enforcing an oral revocation).
113 Ex parte Ilchester (1803) 32 Eng. Rep. 142, 145; 7 Ves. Jun. 348, 356; JOHN R. ROOD,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 321, at 266 (2d ed. 1926) (noting that even after
Parliament began to formalize the law of will execution, “courts held parol revocations
sufficient”).
114 There is no record of the opinion in Cole. Instead, we know about the trial and its
aftermath from other sources. See Mathews v. Warner (1798) 31 Eng. Rep. 96, 107; 4 Ves.
Jun. 187, 211; Prince v. Hazleton, 20 Johns. 502, 512 (N.Y. 1822); ROOD, supra note 113,
§ 218, at 171 n.5.
115 See Mathews, 31 Eng. Rep. at 107.
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 See id.
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declared: “I hope to see one day a law, that no written will should be
revoked but by writing.”119
As luck would have it, Lord Nottingham was uniquely situated to
push the law in that direction. At the time he was presiding over Cole,
he was also drafting the Statute of Frauds. 120 In 1677, a year after Lord
Nottingham’s remarks, Parliament passed this legislation and
formalized the revocation of wills that devised land. 121 Specifically, the
Statute of Frauds established two paths for nullifying such a will. First,
testators could revoke by act by either “burning[,] cancelling [sic][,]
teareing [sic][,] or obliterating the [will]” or having someone else do
so in the testator’s presence. 122 This aspect of the statute codified
existing norms: although the common law did not require it, testators
often took one of these destructive steps to dispel any doubt about
their intent. 123 Second, Parliament mandated that a writing that
revoked a will needed to meet the formalities for being a will. As one
court eloquently put it, “[t]he evidence of revocation . . . must be of
dignity equal to the instrument revoked.”124 I will borrow this phrase
and call the idea that it takes a will to revoke a will the “equal dignity
principle.”
In the early nineteenth century, American states adopted the
Statute of Frauds, and revocation cases took a strange turn. 125 Courts
faced a steady stream of lawsuits contending that a third party had
prevented the testator from destroying her will. 126 The typical claim
was that the testator had orally declared her intent to revoke, thrown
the document onto a fire, and not noticed when someone who
119 Id.
120 See Ash v. Abdy (1678) 36 Eng. Rep. 1014, 1014; 3 Swans. 664 app., 664 app.
(acknowledging Lord Nottingham’s role in drafting the Statute of Frauds); George P.
Costigan, Jr., The Date and Authorship of the Statute of Frauds, 26 HARV. L. REV. 329, 335 (1913)
(same).
121 Statute of Frauds 1677, 29 Car. 2 c. 3, § 6 (Eng.).
122 Id.
123 See LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, RICHARD V. WELLMAN, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER &
MARY LOUISE FELLOWS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 253 (1991) (“many people choose this
method of revoking their wills”).
124 Allen v. Jeter, 74 Tenn. 672, 674 (1881).
125 Some U.S. jurisdictions enacted the Statute of Frauds piecemeal, initially
embracing its provisions that governed the execution of wills but not those that applied to
revocation. See, e.g., Belden v. Carter, 4 Day 66, 68 (Conn. 1809); Clark’s Ex’rs v. Eborn, 6
N.C. (2 Mur.) 234, 235 (1813).
126 See In re Silva’s Estate, 145 P. 1015, 1016–17 (Cal. 1915); Runkle v. Gates, 11 Ind.
95, 99 (1858); Gains v. Gains, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 190, 191 (1820); Graham v. Birch, 49
N.W. 697, 697–98 (Minn. 1891); Mundy v. Mundy, 15 N.J. Eq. 290, 291 (Prerog. Ct. 1858);
Hise v. Fincher, 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 139, 140 (1849); Kent v. Mahaffey, 10 Ohio St. 204, 211
(1859); Clingan v. Mitcheltree, 31 Pa. 25, 26 (1856); Boyd v. Cook, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 32, 55
(1831); cf. Doe v. Harris (1838) 112 Eng. Rep. 737, 740; 8 Ad. & E. 1, 2.
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benefitted from the instrument whisked it to safety. 127 Judges were
understandably skeptical. These allegations seemed to be manufactured to justify the physical integrity of a document that the testator
supposedly meant to destroy. In addition, like Cole, they usually relied
entirely on the testimony of an interested party or one of their allies. 128
And here the new revocation formalities revealed their value.
Although courts once had to wade through a trial, the law now allowed
them to slam the courthouse door. In opinion after opinion, they held
that these fantastic events, even if true, did not satisfy the test for
revocation. 129 As the Supreme Court of Indiana declared in 1858, “a
testator’s intent to revoke [does] not, of itself, render his will
inoperative.”130
But on the opposite side of the ledger, the Statute of Frauds
sometimes forced judges to ignore compelling evidence that a
decedent truly had intended to revoke. For instance, people
occasionally sent letters asking their attorneys to destroy a will that they
had left in the law office for safekeeping. 131 Under the equal dignity
rule, this correspondence was not a revocation by writing because it
was not attested. 132 And even if the lawyer complied with the request,
127 See Doe, 122 Eng. Rep. at 740 (testator “threw the will upon the fire” only to have
one of the beneficiaries “rescue[] it without his knowledge”); Graham, 49 N.W. at 697–98
(testator placed a will in an envelope in an unlit stove only to have the wrongdoer remove
the document from the envelope); cf. In re Silva’s Estate, 145 P. at 1016–17 (testator’s wife
“destroy[ed] an envelope” and lied by telling the testator “that the will was [e]nclosed
therein”); Runkle, 11 Ind. at 99 (testator’s son had falsely declared that he had burnt the
will); Gains, 9 Ky. at 191 (will was “snatched from [the testator’s] hand by the defendant in
error, and forcibly retained by him”); Mundy, 15 N.J. Eq. at 291 (testator’s wife convinced
him she had burnt will); Clingan, 31 Pa. at 26 (same); Hise, 32 N.C. at 141 (testator’s son
threw blank piece of paper on fire); Kent, 10 Ohio St. at 211 (same); Boyd, 30 Va. at 47, 50
(blind testator asked for his will to be destroyed).
128 See, e.g., Hise, 32 N.C. at 139–40 (case rested on a single witness’s testimony); Mundy,
15 N.J. Eq. at 291 (same); Runkle, 11 Ind. at 97 (allegations were supported by three
witnesses); Clingan, 31 Pa. at 37 (noting that “the channel of proof is through persons
pecuniarily interested in [the dispute]”).
129 See In re Silva’s Estate, 145 P. at 1017 (“The mere intent, unperformed, to destroy or
burn the will is not sufficient.”); accord Gains, 9 Ky. at 191; Graham, 49 N.W. at 698; Mundy,
15 N.J. Eq. at 292; Hise, 32 N.C. at 141; Kent, 10 Ohio St. at 218; Boyd, 30 Va. at 55.
130 Runkle, 11 Ind. at 99. Paradoxically, a few courts held that the testator had failed
to revoke but also employed a constructive trust to give the assets to the people who would
have inherited in the absence of the will. See, e.g., Brazil v. Silva, 185 P. 174, 176 (Cal. 1919),
disapproved of on other grounds by Ludwicki v. Guerin, 367 P.2d 415, 419 (Cal. 1961). But see
Kent, 10 Ohio St. at 220–22 (rejecting this position as an improper end-run around the
revocation formalities); Reiter v. Carroll, 198 S.W.2d 163, 166–68 (Ark. 1946) (collecting
cases).
131 See Harris v. McDonald, 108 S.E. 448, 453 (Ga. 1921); In re McGill’s Will, 128 N.E.
194, 194 (N.Y. 1920); c.f. Tynan v. Paschal, 27 Tex. 286, 289 (1863).
132 See Harris, 108 S.E. at 453 (holding that the testator’s letter failed to revoke her will
because it was not “executed with the same formality” as a will) (quoting GA. CIV. CODE
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mutilating the will accomplished nothing, because a destructive act
must be performed in the testator’s presence. 133 Likewise, testators
often scrawled phrases such as “obsolete,”134 “void,” 135 or “I revoke” 136
in the margins or on the backs of their wills. These bare notations were
not revocations by writing because they flunked the equal dignity test:
they were “never attested or subscribed by any witness, much less by
two witnesses.” 137 Also, most courts held that these words were not
revocations by act because they were “not written in such a way as to
have the effect of obliterating or canceling or destroying any words of
the will itself.” 138 Thus, the revocation formalities erected a tightrope
that not all testators could cross.
B. Modern Law
Revocation law shifted again in the nineteenth century, when the
Wills Act replaced the Statute of Frauds as the field’s centerpiece. The
Wills Act applied its revocation rules across the board to all wills—not
just to those that devised land. 139 It also changed the list of permissible
revocatory acts by dropping “cancelling” and “obliterating” and
adding “otherwise destroying.” 140 Only some American states followed
suit. 141 Finally, as time passed, courts added their own layer of

§ 3918 (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-43 (2021))). In addition, testators did not
intend the letter itself to operate as a revocation; rather, they simply meant to arm their
lawyers with the “power to destroy.” Tynan, 27 Tex. at 295; McGill’s Will, 128 N.E. at 196
(rejecting the argument that the testator “intended that the act of signing the paper [to
be] . . . a complete revocation of her will”).
133 See Tynan, 27 Tex. at 295 (opining that if the lawyer had “acted upon the instruction
contained in the letter, and destroyed the will, . . . it would not operate as a destruction”).
For a modern decision involving a testator who called her lawyer and asked him to discard
her will, see Harrison v. Bird, 621 So. 2d 972, 973 (Ala. 1993) (observing that “Ms. Speer’s
will was not lawfully revoked when it was destroyed by her attorney at her direction and with
her consent, but not in her presence”).
134 Lewis v. Lewis, 2 Watts & Serg. 455, 455–56 (Pa. 1841).
135 Howard v. Hunter, 41 S.E. 638, 638 (Ga. 1902); In re Shelton’s Will, 55 S.E. 705, 706
(N.C. 1906).
136 In re Akers’ Will, 77 N.Y.S. 643, 644 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902), aff’d, 66 N.E. 1103 (N.Y.
1903); In re Ladd, 18 N.W. 734, 735 (Wis. 1884).
137 Ladd, 18 N.W. at 735; see also Lewis, 2 Watts & Serg. at 457.
138 Howard, 41 S.E. at 638; see Shelton’s Will, 55 S.E. at 706 (“The words written on the
blank margin of this will do not touch any part of the will proper.”); In re Miller’s Estate,
100 N.Y.S. 344, 346 (Sur. Ct. 1906) (“Not a word of this will was erased, crossed out, marked
over, or in any manner obliterated . . . .”); Ladd, 18 N.W. at 739 (explaining that words of
cancellation must appear “upon the face of the instrument itself, and not upon some
remote corner of the same sheet”).
139 See Wills Act 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, § 20 (Eng., Wales & Ir.).
140 Compare id. with Statute of Frauds 1677, 29 Car. 2 c. 3 § 6. (Eng.)
141 See infra text accompanying note 148.
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revocation formalities. Thus, as this section explains, contemporary
revocation doctrine has become exceedingly complex.
1. Revoking by Act
Although states uniformly permit testators to revoke by act, they
differ on what kind of conduct suffices. Most have merged the Statute
of Frauds and the Wills Act by authorizing burning, canceling, tearing,
obliterating, and destroying. 142 But there are many subtle variations.
Some jurisdictions omit particular acts 143 and others add “defacing,” 144
“cutting,” 145 or “mutilat[ing].” 146
Furthermore, three sub-rules have become increasingly important
in this niche. First, courts distinguish between revocatory acts performed on original wills and those inflicted on mere copies. Because
it can be useful to have more than one version of an instrument,
lawyers once created “duplicate originals”: multiple wills with ink

142 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-136(b) (2021); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.507(a)(2) (2021);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-109(a)(2) (2021); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6120(b) (West 2021); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-11-507(1)(b) (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-507(a)(2) (2021); IDAHO
CODE § 15-2-507(b) (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-611 (2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B,
§ 2-507(a)(2) (2021); ME. STAT. tit. 18-C, § 2-506(1)(B) (2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 700.2507(1)(b) (2021); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-507(a)(2) (2021); MO. REV. STAT. § 474.400
(2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-527(1)(b) (2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.120(1)(a)
(2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:13(I) (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-13(b) (West 2021);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-507(A)(3) (2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.1(2) (2021); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-08-07(1)(b) (2021); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 101(2) (2021); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 112.285(2) (2019); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505(3) (2021); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-506(a)(2)
(2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-507(a)(2) (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-201(3)
(2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-507(1)(b) (West 2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-410(A)
(2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 11(a)(B)(2) (2021); WASH. REV. CODE. § 11.12.040(1)(b)
(2021); WIS. STAT. § 853.11(1m) (2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-117(a)(ii) (2021).
143 Because “destroying” did not appear in the Statute of Frauds, it is also absent from
several revocation statutes. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2507(A)(2) (2021); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 45a-257 (2021); D.C. CODE § 18-109(a)(2) (2021); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-7
(2021); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-105(b)(2) (West 2021); cf. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2107.33(A) (West 2021) (omitting “burning”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 208 (2021)
(only permitting “canceling”); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 253.002 (West 2021) (“destroying or
canceling”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 91-5-3 (2021) (“destroying, canceling, or obliterating”);
33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-5-10 (2021) (“burning, tearing, or otherwise destroying”); IOWA
CODE § 633.284 (2021) (allowing wills to be “canceled or destroyed” but adding that a
cancellation “must be witnessed in the same manner as the making of a new will”).
144 FLA. STAT. § 732.506 (2021).
145 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.080(3) (West 2021); W. VA. CODE § 41-1-7 (2021).
146 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-4.1(a)(2)(A) (McKinney 2021) (“other
mutilation”); IND. CODE § 29-1-5-6 (2021) (“destroy[ing] or mutilat[ing]” the will).
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signatures. 147 In the nineteenth century, courts held that duplicate
originals are “performative,” meaning that revoking one is sufficient
even if other duplicate originals remain. 148 But as office technology
evolved, attorneys began to rely on conformed copies (typewritten
transcriptions of legal instruments) and carbon copies (impressions of
a document made on a kind of tissue paper). 149 Eventually, the Xerox
machine made it even easier to reproduce testamentary instruments. 150
The prevalence of these duplicate non-original wills raised a novel
question: were copies performative, too?
In 1945, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that only originals
can be revoked in In re Wehr‘s Will. 151 William Wehr signed a will that
gave his assets to his siblings, left the original with his lawyer, and kept
a conformed copy. 152 William then married Alberta. 153 Under the law
at the time, Alberta was not entitled to a share of William’s estate as an
accidentally omitted spouse, and the will effectively disinherited her. 154
147 See, e.g., Gushwa v. Hunt (In re Estate of Gushwa), 168 P.3d 147, 152 (N.M. Ct. App.
2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 197 P.3d 1, 5–7 (N.M. 2008) (differentiating between
duplicate originals and copies).
148 See, e.g., Crossman v. Crossman, 95 N.Y. 145, 150 (1884) (“As each contains the will
of the testator, a revocation of either is a revocation of his will, and thus revokes both.”).
The law generally remains unchanged today. See, e.g., In re Estate of Fowler v. Perry, 681
N.E.2d 739, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (“A duplicate will does not survive revocation of the
original.”); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6121 (West 2021) (“A will executed in duplicate . . . is
revoked if one of the duplicates is burned, torn, canceled, obliterated, or destroyed, with
the intent and for the purpose of revoking it . . . .”); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-507(c) (2021)
(“The revocation of a will executed in duplicate may be accomplished by revoking one (1)
of the duplicates.”). But cf. Estate of Koester v. First Mid-Ill. Bank & Tr., 975 N.E.2d 1115,
1125 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“[I]f a testator has possession of both duplicate original wills and
burns only one of them, the surviving duplicate original will has not been revoked”
(emphasis omitted)).
149 See, e.g., In re Karcher’s Estate, 16 N.Y.S.2d 577, 578 (Sur. Ct. 1939) (involving the
execution of an original will and a conformed copy); Conformed Copy, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining a “conformed copy” as “[a]n exact copy of a
document bearing written explanations of things that were not or could not be copied, such
as a note on the document indicating that it was signed by a person whose signature appears
on the original”); Julia Lawlor, Carbon Paper Still Messy, Still in Use, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12,
1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/12/technology/carbon-paper-still-messy-stillin-use.html [https://perma.cc/6PAQ-TRNA] (discussing the rise and fall of carbon paper).
150 See Kate O’Connell, Happy Birthday, Copy Machine! Happy Birthday, Copy Machine!,
NPR (Oct. 23, 2013), https://www.npr.org/2013/10/23/239241106/happy-birthday-copymachine-happy-birthday-copy-machine [https://perma.cc/7LQY-D3AC] (describing the
emergence of the commercial photocopier).
151 Wehr v. Wehr (In re Wehr’s Will), 18 N.W.2d 709 (Wis. 1945).
152 See id. at 710, 715.
153 See id. at 710.
154 See id. at 714–15. Today, a spouse who marries a testator after the execution of the
will is generally entitled to a share of the estate. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-301(a)
(UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019).
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Nevertheless, after William passed away, the conformed copy of the will
was found in his desk with its signature torn out. 155 Alberta argued that
because William did not possess the original, his destruction of the
copy should serve as a revocation. 156 The court disagreed, refusing to
allow what it called “a symbolic revocation,” and reasoning that
treating copies as performative would open the door to fraud. 157 Since
Wehr, courts have uniformly held that “a revocatory act performed on
a mere []copy is legally ineffective.” 158 I will call this the “copy rule.”
Second, revocation statutes continue to restrict revocations by
third parties. Most states mandate that other people perform a revocatory act “in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction.” 159
155 See Wehr, 18 N.W.2d at 715.
156 See id.
157 See id. (“There is no proof that the desk was locked or that the papers were not
open to numerous other persons.”). The court also cited the text of the revocation statute,
which requires testators to deface a “will,” rather than a copy. Id. (quoting WIS. STAT.
§ 238.14 (1943) (current version at WIS. STAT. § 853.11(1m) (2021)).
158 Gushwa v. Hunt (In re Estate of Gushwa), 197 P.3d 1, 6 (N.M. 2008); In re
D’Agostino’s Will, 75 A.2d 913, 915 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950) (citing Wehr to hold
that a revocation failed when the destroyed writing was “a conformed or unexecuted copy
rather than a duplicate”); Brewer v. Brewer (In re Estate of Brewer), 35 N.E.3d 149, 153 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2015) (“[A] revocatory act performed on any photocopy is legally ineffective.”); In
re Krieger, 595 N.Y.S.2d 272, 272 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (“[A] will cannot be revoked by the
physical destruction of an unexecuted conformed copy . . . .”); In re Estate of Charitou, 595
N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (Sur. Ct. 1993) (“Objectants [sic] have not cited, nor has the court found,
a single decision in which the court permitted revocation by physical act to take place other
than upon the testamentary instrument itself.”); Gassmann v. Stanton (In re Estate of
Stanton), 472 N.W.2d 741, 747 (N.D. 1991) (“[T]he destruction of an unexecuted or
conformed copy is ineffectual as an act of revocation regardless of the testator’s intent.”);
cf. In re Estate of Tolin, 622 So. 2d 988, 990–91 (Fla. 1993) (holding that “the testator’s
destruction of a copy of a codicil is not an effective revocation of the codicil” but fixing the
testator’s mistake using the equitable remedy of constructive trust); Lauermann v. Superior
Ct., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 258, 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the phrase “duplicate
original” does not include a photocopy (quoting CAL. PROB. CODE § 6124 (West 1991)
(current version at CAL. PROB. CODE § 6124 (West 2021)))).
159 ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-109(a)(2) (2021); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6120(b)(2) (West
2021); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-507(1)(b) (2021) (requiring “conscious” presence);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-257 (2021) (skipping “and”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 208 (2021)
(requiring “express” direction); D.C. CODE § 18-109(a)(2) (2021) (using pronouns for the
testator and requiring “express direction and consent”); FLA. STAT. § 732.506 (2021) (“by”
replaced with “at”); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-7(a)(2) (2021) (using pronouns for the
testator and requiring “direction and consent”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-611 (2021) (skipping
“and” and using pronouns); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.080(3) (West 2021) (using
pronouns); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-105(b)(2) (West 2020) (requiring “express
direction and consent”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-3 (2021) (saying “in his or her presence,
or by subsequent will, codicil, or declaration, in writing, made and executed”); MO. REV.
STAT. § 474.400 (2021) (using pronouns and requiring “consent and direction”); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 133.120(1)(a) (2019) (using “in the presence and at the direction of the testator”);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:13(I) (2021) (switching the phrases’ order and using “consent”
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A handful of legislatures have imposed additional elements, such as
requiring that third party revocations be authorized by the testator in
writing 160 or overseen by two witnesses. 161 At the opposite pole, about
a dozen jurisdictions have slightly softened this rule by permitting the
revocatory act to occur in the testator’s “conscious presence,” 162 which
can be anywhere within the testator’s zone of sight or hearing. 163
Third, when a will was last in the testator’s possession but cannot
be found after her death, courts assume that she revoked it. 164 The

instead of “direction”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.1(2) (2021); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 101(2)
(2021) (using pronouns); 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-5-10 (2021) (using pronouns); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-2-506(a)(2) (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-201(3) (2021); TEX. EST. CODE
ANN. § 253.002 (West 2021) (using “causing it to be destroyed or canceled in the testator’s
presence”); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-410(A) (2021) (using pronouns and switching the
phrases’ order); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 11(a)(1)(B) (2021) (requiring “conscious
presence”); W. VA. CODE § 41-1-7 (2021) (using pronouns); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6117(a)(ii) (2021) (using pronouns); cf. IOWA CODE § 633.284 (2021) (not permitting
revocation by third parties under any circumstances); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1607(1)
(2021) (not imposing a presence requirement).
160 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.33(A)(3) (West 2021).
161 See ALA. CODE § 43-8-136(b) (2021) (“If the physical act is by someone other than
the testator, consent and direction of the testator must be proved by at least two witnesses.”);
OR. REV. STAT. § 112.285(2) (2019) (same effect); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505(3) (2021)
(same effect); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.040(1)(b) (2021) (same effect); N.Y. EST. POWERS
& TRUSTS LAW § 3-4.1(a)(2)(A)(ii) (McKinney 2021) (same and also requiring that neither
of the witnesses “shall be the person who performed the act of revocation”).
162 COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-507(b) (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-507(a)(2)
(2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 2-507(a)(2) (2021); ME. STAT. tit. 18-C, § 2-506(1)(B)
(2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2507(1)(b) (2021); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-507(a)(2)
(2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-527(1)(b) (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-13(b) (West
2021); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-507(A)(3) (2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-07(1)(b)
(2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-507(a)(2) (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-507(1)(b)
(West 2021); WIS. STAT. § 853.11(1m) (2021).
163 See, e.g., Lehman v. Tracy (In re Tracy’s Estate), 182 P.2d 336, 336–37 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1947) (holding that testator revoked will by asking third parties to act in an adjoining
room that was within earshot); Whitacre v. Crowe, 972 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ohio Ct. App.
2012) (defining “conscious presence,” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (West 2010), to
encompass conduct that occurs “in the testator’s range of vision or that the testator [can]
hear and understand”).
164 See, e.g., Frakes v. Thieme (In re Estate of Frakes), 146 N.E.3d 801, 810–11 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2020) (“[I]t has long been established, where a last will and testament, after its
execution, is retained in the exclusive control of the decedent and upon his or her death
cannot be found, a presumption arises that the decedent destroyed the will . . . .”); Golini
v. Bolton (In re Estate of Arant), 482 S.E.2d 784, 788 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (“If the testator
was known to have her last will in her possession or had ready access to it, and it cannot be
found on her death, it is presumed, rebuttably, that she destroyed it and thereby revoked
it.”); cf. Kitta v. Geringer (In re Estate of Mecello), 633 N.W.2d 892, 902 (Neb. 2001)
(declining to apply the presumption when “a person other than [the testator] who would
benefit from the revocation of the 1996 will had access to the box which [the testator] had
stated contained her will”).
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logic behind this so-called “presumption of animo revocandi”165 is that
a testamentary instrument that disappears was more likely destroyed
than misplaced:
Persons in general keep their wills in places of safety, or, as we here
technically express it, “among their papers of moment and
concern.” . . . [I]f the instrument be not found in the repositories
of the testator, where he had placed it, the common sense of the
matter, prima facie, is that he himself destroyed it, meaning to
revoke it. 166

However, the proponent of a will can demonstrate otherwise through
“statements [by] the decedent [that she] did not intend to revoke the
will, and evidence of other individual[s’] access to the will prior to
death.” 167 If the presumption is rebutted, a court can admit a copy of
the will to probate as proof of the terms of the original. 168
2. Revoking by Writing
There are two basic approaches to written revocations. First, many
states boast “broad” revocation statutes. These laws allow testators to
rescind a testamentary instrument by creating either “a subsequent
will” or a “writing” that is technically not a will but is “executed with
the same formalities required for the execution of wills.”169 Second, a

165 See, e.g., Nordahl v. Jensen (In re Estate of Blikre), 934 N.W.2d 867, 872 (N.D. 2019).
166 In re Estate of Hartman, 563 P.2d 569, 571 (Mont. 1977) (quoting Colvin v. Fraser
(1829) 162 Eng. Rep. 856, 877; 2 Hagg. Ecc. 266, 326); see also Feder v. Nation of Israel, 830
S.W.2d 449, 452 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (“A will is universally recognized as a sacred document.
When the testator desires to dispose of his assets according to his will, a certain degree of
care and caution in its preservation, is required.”).
167 Frakes, 146 N.E.3d at 811. Some states hold that evidence must be “clear,
satisfactory and convincing” to rebut the presumption. In re Davis’ Will, 11 A.2d 233, 236
(N.J. 1940); accord Easley v. Ferguson (In re Estate of Cannon), 733 So. 2d 245, 248 (Miss.
1999); Briscoe v. Schneider (In re Estate of Penne), 775 P.2d 925, 927 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
In other jurisdictions, the standard is a mere preponderance. See, e.g., In re Estate of Glover,
744 S.W.2d 939, 940 (Tex. 1988).
168 See, e.g., In re Estate of Richard, 556 A.2d 1091, 1092 (Me. 1989) (affirming a
probate court ruling that had “allowed the copy in place of the original ‘to carry out the
will (wishes and desires) of the deceased’”); W.W. THORNTON, A MONOGRAPH ON THE LAW
OF LOST WILLS § 58 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1890) (discussing the practice of judges
validating “a draft[] or a duplicate” when the presumption is rebutted).
169 FLA. STAT. § 732.505(2) (2021); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 208 (2021); D.C.
CODE § 18-109(a)(1) (2021); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-42(b) (2021); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/4-7 (2021); IND. CODE § 29-1-5-6 (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-611 (2021); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 394.080(1)–(2) (West 2021); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1607(2) (2021); MISS.
CODE. ANN. § 91-5-3 (2021); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-4.1(a)(1)(B) (McKinney
2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.1(1) (2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.33(4)–(5) (West
2021); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 101(1) (2021); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505 (2021); 33 R.I. GEN.
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handful of jurisdictions have “narrow” revocation legislation. They
limit written revocations to full-fledged “will[s] which revoke[] the
prior will.”170
The difference between these regimes rears its head when a
testator attempts to execute what I call an “anti-will”: a writing that
satisfies the execution formalities but merely tries to override a
previous will. Anti-wills differ from conventional wills in two ways.
First, according to some definitions, a will must bequeath the testator’s
property. 171 But anti-wills do not convey assets to anyone. 172 Second,
wills only kick in after the testator dies, but anti-wills purport to take
effect upon execution. 173
It would be hard to exaggerate the confusion that anti-wills have
engendered. Recall that broad statutes allow revocations by a
“subsequent will” and a “writing” executed with the formalities of a
will. 174 Thus, these laws permit revocation by a document that does not
meet the technical definition of a “will.”175 Indeed, courts in jurisdictions with broad statutes have enforced revocations by writings
“incapable of operating as a will,” 176 such as a “blank form of a will with
some of the spaces filled in,” 177 a questionnaire used to prepare for a
meeting with an estate planner, 178 and a contract between divorcing
LAWS § 33-5-10 (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-201(1)–(2) (2021); TEX. EST. CODE ANN.
§ 253.002 (West 2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-410(B) (2021); W. VA. CODE § 41-1-7 (2021).
170 ALA. CODE § 43-8-136(a) (2021); see also ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.507(a)(1) (2021);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2507 (2021); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-109 (2021); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 45a-257 (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-507 (2021); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-507
(2021); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.284 (2021); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-105 (West
2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 2-507 (2021); ME. STAT. tit. 18-C, § 2-506 (2021); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 700.2507 (2021); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-507 (2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2527 (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-13 (West 2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.120 (2019); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-07 (2021); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.285 (2019); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2506 (2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-507 (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-507 (West
2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 11 (2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.040 (2021); WIS. STAT.
§ 853.11 (2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-117 (2021).
171 See, e.g., Holmden v. Craig, 31 Ohio Cir. Dec. 461, 467 (1909) (“[A] will always
disposes of property.”), aff’d, 94 N.E. 1108 (Ohio 1910) (per curiam); In re Sherman’s
Estate, 3 Pa. D. & C.2d 677, 680 (Pa. Orphans’ Ct. 1955) (holding that a document was not
a will where “[t]here is no disposition of property anywhere in the paper”).
172 See, e.g., Kiknadze v. Elis, No. 1166, 2020 WL 4937994, at *5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
Aug. 24, 2020).
173 See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 21 So. 3d 1, 6 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).
174 See supra text accompanying note 169 (emphasis added).
175 These non-wills are sometimes called “nontestamentary writings.” See 79 AM. JUR.
2D Wills § 468, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2021).
176 In re Estate of Stege, 293 N.Y.S. 856, 866 (Sur. Ct. 1937).
177 Id. at 860.
178 In re Estate of Diana, No. 98 CA 104, 1999 WL 436732, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June
21, 1999).
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spouses. 179 In fact, in holographic states, testators can revoke by
handwriting simple notations such as “cancelled,” 180 “revoke[d],” 181 or
“null and void” 182 on their will and signing or initialing below.
FIGURE 4: LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF HOWARD L. ANDERSEN 183

Conversely, courts in states with narrow revocation statutes are
divided about the permissibility of anti-wills. Although these laws
require a “will” to revoke a will, some courts have opined that the
legislature did not use this word “in its technical sense,” but rather
merely meant “a writing executed with the solemnity of a will.” 184
179 Dunsworth v. Dunsworth, 81 P.2d 9, 15 (Kan. 1938).
180 McCarthy v. Bank of Cal. (In re Estate of Langan), 668 P.2d 481, 482 (Or. Ct. App.
1983).
181 Rogers v. Andersen (In re Estate of Andersen), No. B194657, 2008 WL 116430, at
*1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2008).
182 In re Kehr’s Estate, 95 A.2d 647, 648 (Pa. 1953).
183 Appellant’s Opening Brief at Exhibit 31 p. 1, In re Estate of Andersen, 2008 WL
116430 (No. B194657), 2007 WL 2273771 at *63.
184 In re Peirce’s Estate, 115 P. 835, 837 (Wash. 1911); see also In re Heazle’s Estate, 240
P.2d 821, 822–23 (Idaho 1952) (rejecting the argument that a document that “makes no
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However, other judges read the revocation statute literally and disallow
anti-wills. 185 For instance, in Brown v. Brown, R.B. Brown executed a
will in 1957. 186 In 2006, Brown signed a writing that declared his intent
to “revoke all last wills and testaments heretofore made by me; it being
my intention and desire to die without a will.”187 An Alabama appellate
court held that Brown’s attempt to make an anti-will did not comply
with the state’s narrow revocation statute because it was not a “will”:
By its terms, the revocation document was intended to take effect
immediately, not upon the death of the decedent. Moreover, the
revocation document did not determine the disposition of the
decedent’s property after his death. Because the revocation
document is not a “subsequent will,” we conclude that that
document did not meet the statutory requirements to revoke the
1957 will. 188

Thus, Brown’s purported anti-will accomplished nothing. 189
3. Revoking by Cancellation
The revocatory method of “cancellation” has also proven to be
problematic. Attempted cancellations can take two forms. First, the
testator might draw lines through the language of the will. Cases
involving this method are relatively simple: they hinge on “whether the
evidence sustains the conclusion that the cancellation was done by the
testator with the intent and purpose of revoking . . . the will.” 190 But

disposition of property and appoints no representative and is uncertain and indefinite . . .
fails as a will and therefore also fails as a revocation”).
185 See, e.g., Kiknadze v. Elis, No. 1166, 2020 WL 4937994, at *5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
Aug. 24, 2020) (refusing to enforce attempted anti-will). Two recent cases in this camp
come from New Mexico. See, e.g., Gushwa v. Hunt (In re Estate of Gushwa), 197 P.3d 1, 3
(N.M. 2008) (“[O]ur Probate Code, unlike that of other states, does not allow for
revocation of a will by any ‘other writing.’” (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-507(A)(1) (1993)
(current version at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-507(A)(1) (2021)))); Sanchez v. Martinez (In re
Estate of Martinez), 985 P.2d 1230, 1232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (reasoning that the
revocation statute “contains no provision that permits a testator to revoke a will by
execution of a nontestamentary document”). When they were decided, the state’s
revocation statute “require[d] revocation by a subsequent will” and did not allow revocation
“by ‘any other writing.’” Gushwa, 197 P.3d at 4. However, the legislature later amended
the law to authorize revocation “by executing another subsequent document” that complies
with the execution formalities. 2011 N.M. Laws ch. 124 § 23; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2507(A)(2) (2021). Thus, these opinions are no longer good law.
186 21 So. 3d 1, 2 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).
187 Id. The opinion does not say whether the writing was attested. However, the fact
that the court treated it as an anti-will suggests that it met the execution formalities.
188 Id. at 6.
189 See id.
190 Train v. Sherer (In re Martens’ Estate), 74 P.2d 238, 239 (Cal. 1937).
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second, a testator might write words of cancellation, such as “void,” on
the will. This technique has spawned “much . . . litigation.”191
Unfortunately, words of cancellation straddle the boundary
between revocation by act and revocation by writing. On the one hand,
words of cancellation might be an attempt to annul an instrument by
defacing it—a slightly more elaborate version of crossing out its text.
Seen this way, scrawling something like “I revoke” should, in fact,
revoke the will, just like tearing it, burning it, or drawing a large “X”
would. But on the other hand, it is equally possible to conceptualize
words of cancellation as an attempt to make an anti-will. To be valid
under the equal dignity principle, words of cancellation would thus
need to satisfy the execution formalities.
Most jurisdictions distinguish between these options by examining whether the words of cancellation touch the language of the will.
If the writing intersects with the instrument’s text, courts deem it to be
a revocation by the act of cancellation. As the Georgia Supreme Court
explained in 1902, “if any material part of the will is obliterated or
marked, or words indicating an intention to revoke written across the
same, . . . the instrument will be said to have been revoked.” 192
Alternatively, when words of cancellation occupy a blank part of the
will, judges treat them as an attempt to revoke by anti-will. 193 In turn,
this move is usually fatal to the testator’s intent because words of
cancellation are rarely signed by witnesses. 194
191 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt.
g (AM. L. INST. 1999).
192 Howard v. Hunter, 41 S.E. 638, 638 (Ga. 1902); see also Note, Wills—Revocation by
Cancellation, 31 YALE L.J. 892, 893 (1922) (“[A] writing upon the back or margin of a will
has been held not to be a revocation within the contemplation of the statute, upon the
theory that no material part of the will has been cancelled.”).
193 See, e.g., Dowling v. Gilliland, 122 N.E. 70, 72 (Ill. 1919) (“It could not be said that
a will is canceled in the slighest [sic] degree by reason of marks or scratches made upon
blank places on the will.”); Yont v. Eads, 57 N.E.2d 531, 532 (Mass. 1944) (“[T]he prevailing
view requires some defacement of the words of the will.”); In re Danielly’s Estate, 81 A.2d
519, 520 (N.J. Camden County Ct. 1951) (“The great weight of authority is to the effect that
the mere writing upon a will which does not in any wise physically obliterate or cancel the
same is insufficient to work a revocation of the will even though the writing may express an
intention to revoke.”); In re Akers’ Will, 77 N.Y.S. 643, 646 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902), aff’d, 66
N.E. 1103 (N.Y. 1903) (“There can be no such thing as a cancellation of an instrument,
either as a physical fact or as a legal inference, unless the instrument itself is in some form
defaced or obliterated.”); Lewis v. Lewis, 2 Watts & Serg. 455, 457 (Pa. 1841) (“It cannot be
pretended that writing the word ‘obsolete’ [in the margins] can be considered as a burning,
cancelling, obliterating or destroying the will.”); Thompson v. Royall, 175 S.E. 748, 750 (Va.
1934) (“[R]evocation of a will by cancellation . . . contemplates marks or lines across the
written parts of the instrument, or a physical defacement, or some mutilation of the writing
itself, with the intent to revoke.”).
194 See, e.g., Taft v. Zack, 830 So. 2d 881, 882–83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (determining
that testator did not revoke will when she lined out the name of her husband and wrote the
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4. Revoking Electronic Wills
As noted, digital wills are likely to become a major force in estate
planning. 195 However, as this section explains, prescribing revocation
formalities for e-wills has proven to be challenging.
Defining how a testator can revoke an e-will by act is a mindbending problem. Some of the conduct listed in the revocation
statutes, such a burning and tearing the document, does not apply to
digital files. This issue is so thorny that the authors of the UEWA
seriously “considered not permitting revocation by physical act” and
only relented because “many people would assume that they could
revoke their wills by deleting them.”196 Ultimately, the UEWA chose to
blandly announce that digital wills can be voided by “a physical act,” if
the testator’s intent to revoke can be established by a preponderance
of the evidence. 197 The comments to the model law elaborate that
revocatory conduct “could include deleting a file with the click of a
mouse or smashing a flash drive with a hammer.”198
In a testament to the difficulty of regulating revocation of e-wills
by act, each industry-drafted statute offers its own take on the issue.
Arizona weaves digital wills into its general revocation statute by stating
that the testator or another person in the testator’s presence and by
the testator’s direction may perform a “‘revocatory act on the will,’
[which] includes burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, rendering

word “void” and her initials next to the makings); Yont, 57 N.E.2d at 532 (“Failing as a
cancellation, the writing had no revocatory effect because it was not ‘signed, attested and
subscribed in the same manner as a will’ as required by the statute.”); Akers’ Will, 77 N.Y.S.
at 647 (“Where a will is sought to be revoked solely by writing, it must conform in that
respect to the requirement of the statute; and, failing in that, it does not revoke the will,
even though there may be a clear intention so to do.”); Lewis, 2 Watts & Serg. at 458 (“[T]his
was not a revocation for want of a signing by the testator.”); Thompson, 175 S.E. at 750 (“The
attempted revocation is ineffectual, because testatrix intended to revoke her will by
subsequent writings not executed as required by statute . . . .”); In re Ladd, 18 N.W. 734,
734–35 (Wis. 1884) (refusing to enforce attempted revocation when wrote “I revoke this
will” on blank page and added her signature because the words were “never attested or
subscribed by any witness, much less by two witnesses”).
195 See supra text accompanying notes 99–109.
196 Memorandum from Suzanne Brown Walsh, Chair, Unif. L. Comm’n, Turney P.
Berry, Vice Chair, Unif. L. Comm’n, & Susan N. Gary, Reporter, Unif. L. Comm’n, to Unif.
L. Comm’n 2 (May 30, 2019) (available at https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic
/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=134c0ae2-a0ae-2752-1497f47d8c1d9d75&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/Q3JN-LBKK]).
197 UEWA, supra note 28, § 7(b)(2); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-37-05(2)(b) (2021);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1407(2)(b) (West 2021); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.12.400–11.12.491
( 2021); cf. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-12-1507(2)(b) (2020) (requiring clear and convincing
evidence for revocations by act) (repealed 2021).
198 UEWA, supra note 28, § 7 cmt. (Physical Act Revocation).
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unreadable or destroying the will.”199 Florida sets a high bar for proving
revocation, declaring that an e-will “is revoked by the testator, or some
other person in the testator’s presence and at the testator’s direction,
by deleting, canceling, rendering unreadable, or obliterating [the
will] . . . as proved by clear and convincing evidence.” 200 Indiana
provides that a testator who is not storing an e-will with a custodian can
revoke “by permanently deleting each copy of the electronic record
associated with the electronic will in the testator’s possession or control
or by rendering the electronic record for the associated electronic will
unreadable and nonretrievable.”201 Finally, Nevada specifies that
“[a]n electronic will may only be revoked by: . . . [c]ancelling [sic],
rendering unreadable or obliterating the will with the intention of
revoking it, by . . . [t]he testator or a person in the presence and at the
direction of the testator.” 202 Thus, although these laws share the
common thread of authorizing revocation by making files
“unreadable,” they also diverge on topics like whether to recognize
revocation by cancellation and the appropriate standard of proof.
Digital will legislation is more uniform on the subject of
revocation by writing. Each statute preserves the equal dignity
principle by decreeing that a testator can only invalidate an electronic
will “[b]y executing a subsequent will.”203 Yet some laws also import
the equal dignity principle into a new context. Recall that industrydrafted laws encourage testators to store their wills with qualified
custodians. 204 Thus, testators who use these services cannot revoke
their digital wills themselves. In turn, this raises questions about the
degree of formality that should be required when a client
communicates her desire to revoke to a custodian. On the one hand,
it seems perverse to insist that a testator execute a solemn document
just to set the wheels of revocation in motion. But on the other hand,
traditional law has never let third parties revoke a will outside of the
testator’s presence, 205 and permitting custodians to honor informal
expressions of intent might open the door to fraud. Thus, in Arizona
and Nevada, a custodian is only bound by a directive to revoke that is

199 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2507(A)(2) (2021) (emphasis added). Conversely,
Maryland’s e-will statute does not mention revocation at all. See H.B. 1261, 2021 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Md. 2021).
200 FLA. STAT. § 732.506 (2021).
201 IND. CODE § 29-1-21-8(c) (2021).
202 NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.120(2) (2019).
203 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2507(A)(1) (2021); see also FLA. STAT. § 732.505(2)
(2021); IND. CODE § 29-1-21-8(b) (2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.120(2)(a) (2019); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-2-1407(2)(a) (West 2021); UEWA, supra note 28, at § 7(b)(1).
204 See supra text accompanying notes 105–106.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 159–163.
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embodied “in a writing executed with the same formalities required
for the execution of an electronic will.”206
*

*

*

From the copy rule to electronic will statutes, the American legal
system makes it surprisingly difficult to revoke a will. This next Part
argues that this hidden pocket of formalism is problematic.
III.

CRITIQUING THE REVOCATION FORMALITIES

Although scholars have catalogued the advantages and drawbacks
of the Wills Act and holograph laws, 207 the revocation formalities have
largely escaped notice. This Part takes up the gauntlet. It reveals that
some revocation requirements serve important goals, but many do not.
Even worse, these bright line rules routinely thwart a testator’s intent.
A. The Copy Rule
Arguably, the copy rule advances each of the four functions of
formalities. 208 First, it plays an evidentiary role. As noted, reproductions of wills are pervasive. 209 Indeed, “[a] testator may make several
photocopies of his or her will, perhaps to send to relatives or other
beneficiaries, or to retain for the purpose of drafting possible
changes.” 210 Thus, as a New York probate judge reasoned, treating
these copies as potentially revocable would sow confusion about the
testator’s intent:
[I]n cases where the executed original, but not all of the
photocopies, can be found after decedent’s death, it might be
206 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2522(C) (2021); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.330(2)(e)
(2019). Conversely, Indiana merely requires testators to inform these entities “in writing.”
IND. CODE § 29-1-21-8(e) (2021).
207 See supra text accompanying notes 16–26.
208 Judges have also grounded the copy rule in the text of revocation statutes. These
laws usually authorize revocation by “burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or
destroying the will.” UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-507 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019) (emphasis added).
In turn, the italicized words demonstrate that “the document destroyed must be the
original.” In re Estate of Tolin, 622 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 1993); see also Gushwa v. Hunt (In
re Estate of Gushwa), 197 P.3d 1, 6 (N.M. 2008) (“[O]ur Probate Code mandates that a
revocatory act be performed ‘on the will.’”) (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-507(A)(2)
(1993) (current version at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-507(A)(3) (2021)); Wehr v. Wehr (In re
Wehr’s Will), 18 N.W.2d 709, 715 (Wis. 1945) (“There is no room in the language of [the
revocation statute] for construction broad enough to include a copy of the will.”); see also
supra text accompanying note 158. Because my goal is to persuade lawmakers to amend
their revocation legislation, I will not dwell on this issue.
209 See supra text accompanying notes 147–50.
210 Lauermann v. Superior Ct., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 258, 261–62 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
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contended that one or more of the photocopies had been
destroyed by decedent with the intention to revoke the will. Of
course, in all of these cases, the party whose testamentary intentions
are at stake and whose acts are in question is the maker of the will
whose lips have been sealed for eternity. 211

Second, the copy rule seems consistent with the ritual function. A
photocopy is usually a pale substitute for the thick paper and “wet”
signatures of the real thing. 212 Accordingly, there is a plausible
argument that deeming copies to be performative would not “impress
upon the mind of the testator the solemnity of the occasion.” 213 Third,
the copy rule can be justified on protective grounds. Because people
usually keep their original will in a safe place, it is easier for wrongdoers
to obtain a copy. By making these stray documents irrelevant, the copy
rule limits the risk of fraud. 214 Fourth, the copy rule has a channeling
dimension. It conserves judicial resources by making revocation cases
pivot on the clear-cut issue of the physical appearance of a single
document. 215
But these benefits come at a hefty price. Under the copy rule, it
does not matter how emphatically the testator defaced the document,
how potent the evidence is of her intent, or even whether she was
simply following her lawyer’s instructions. One decedent took his
counsel’s advice and “wrote ‘Revoked’ on each page of th[e] copy.” 216
Another crossed out the copy’s text, wrote that “[t]he Will . . . is void,”

211 In re Estate of Charitou, 595 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (Sur. Ct. 1993); see also Gushwa, 197
P.3d at 6 (“Photocopies can be readily produced and the existence of multiple copies of a
will can engender confusion, especially when the issue is whether the will has been validly
revoked.”).
212 See Lauermann, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 262 (“[N]ot only are photocopies ubiquitous,
but the simplicity of their creation stands in stark contrast to the considerable formalities
surrounding the execution of a will.”).
213 Charitou, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 310 (quoting Coffed v. Waley (In re Estate of Coffed), 387
N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (N.Y. 1979)).
214 For instance, as an Oklahoma appellate court observed, originals are tamperresistant in a way that copies are not:
[A]n individual, using common office computers, scanners, and software, could
create an unauthorized will, scan and reproduce an authentic signature from
another document, and merge the authentic signature and the bogus document.
After making a photocopy of the bogus document, the final result would be
indistinguishable from a photocopy of an authentic document. . . . [T]he
statutory requirement of an original signature on reproduced documents would
serve as a safeguard against such an acts [sic].
Goodwin v. Goodwin (In re Estate of Goodwin), 18 P.3d 373, 376 n.3 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000).
215 See In re Estate of Sullivan, 868 N.W.2d 750, 753 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) (reasoning
that the copy rule helps “avoid substantial litigation based on potentially fraudulent
changes on photocopies”).
216 Gushwa, 197 P.3d at 2.
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and added both her initials and a signature. 217 And yet another went
to even greater lengths after scheduling a meeting with her estate
planner:
Prior to the appointment, decedent had written the word “Void” at
the top of the first page of the photocopy. During the meeting with
counsel, decedent wrote the word “Cancelled” across the first page
of the photocopy under which notation she wrote the date and her
initials. Decedent then cut her signature out of the second page of
the photocopy. The latter two acts were performed in the presence
of decedent’s niece, her husband, and two attorneys. 218

None of these attempted revocations survived the copy rule. 219
B. Presence
“Presence” has long been one of the most divisive elements of the
Wills Act. In most states, the testator must sign or acknowledge her
will before two witnesses who are present at the same time. 220
Commentators have criticized this formality’s potential for generating
cases in which one witness looked away at the key moment or left “the
room to powder her nose before the other has completed signing.”221
Yet there are plausible evidentiary, ritual, and protective justifications
for this aspect of the statute. As the California Supreme Court
reasoned, by making the testator’s acknowledgement of the will “quasi
public” and “solemn,” there is “less likelihood [of] fraud . . . and more
likelihood of an accurate memory.”222
Conversely, the rationale for the rule that a third party must
revoke a will in the testator’s presence is less well-articulated. Some
courts have gestured towards the idea that it plays the same evidentiary

217 Sullivan, 868 N.W.2d at 751 (first alteration in original).
218 Charitou, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 309; cf. Gassman v. Stanton (In re Estate of Stanton), 472
N.W.2d 741, 746–47 (N.D. 1991) (featuring a testator who crumpled a certified copy of the
will that a third party presented to him and then threw it away).
219 See Gushwa, 197 P.3d at 6–7; Sullivan, 868 N.W.2d at 753; Charitou, 595 N.Y.S.2d at
311–12. Admittedly, Gushwa remanded the matter for the trial court to consider whether
to impose a constructive trust on the assets for the benefit of the people who would inherit
had the will been revoked. See Gushwa, 197 P.3d at 7. I discuss this remedy below in Section
IV.A.
220 See supra text accompanying note 59.
221 John H. Langbein, Major Reforms of the Property Restatement and the Uniform Probate
Code: Reformation, Harmless Error, and Nonprobate Transfers, 38 ACTEC L.J. 1, 9 (2012).
222 In re Emart’s Estate, 165 P. 707, 708 (Cal. 1917); COMM’RS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE
INTO THE L. OF ENG. RESPECTING REAL PROP., COPY OF THE FOURTH REPORT MADE TO HIS
MAJESTY BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE LAW OF ENGLAND
RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY, 1833, HC, at 18 (remarking that “if the transaction must be
witnessed by both witnesses at one time, they must then agree in the same story, and perjury
will be more easily detected by cross-examination”).
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role as the Wills Act’s presence formality. 223 But that is not persuasive.
In the execution context, simultaneous presence helps sear the event
into the witness’ minds, “thus enabling them to testify with greater
assurance that the will was intended to be operative.” 224 But insisting
that a third party revoke near the testator does not generate proof of
anything. Indeed, by the time of any trial, the testator will be deceased
and thus unable to testify.
Another view is that presence deters unintentional or counterfeit
revocations. 225 For instance, in Estate of Haugk, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court refused to enforce a revocation that happened outside of the
testator’s presence. 226 Marie Haugk, who was married to Horst Haugk,
hired a lawyer to update her will. 227 Shortly after Marie met with the
estate planner, but before she had signed the new will, she asked Horst
to go to the incinerator in the basement of their building and burn her
old will. 228 Because Marie’s heart condition prevented her from
walking up or down stairs, she remained behind in their apartment. 229
The court opined that deeming the will to be void would open the
door to mistakes and wrongdoing:
The requirement that a will must be destroyed in the “testator’s
presence” must be strictly construed. This strict construction is
necessary so as to prevent the inadvertent or more importantly the
fraudulent destruction of a will contrary to the testator’s intentions.
Each element recited in the revocation statute must be established
by adequate evidence as this court will not adopt a position that will
promote either intestacy or the fraudulent destruction of an
individual’s last will and testament. 230

But this logic also rings hollow. Demanding that a third party
revoke in the testator’s presence is not necessary to prevent the
“inadvertent or . . . fraudulent destruction of a will.” 231 Revocation law
patrols this border through a different formality: the requirement that
223 See, e.g., Reiter v. Carroll, 198 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Ark. 1946) (reasoning that the
revocation formalities are designed to bar false oral testimony); Campbell v. Griefen (In re
Mitchell’s Estate), 27 N.E.2d 606, 609 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940) (implying that the revocation
formalities serve the same purposes as the execution formalities); In re McGill’s Will, 128
N.E. 194, 196 (N.Y. 1920) (same).
224 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 16, at 8–9.
225 See Mitchell’s Estate, 27 N.E.2d at 609 (“All the authorities declare that the object of
the law is to prevent fraud and imposition upon the testator or the substitution of a
surreptitious will . . . .”) (quoting Walker v. Walker, 174 N.E. 541, 543 (Ill. 1930)).
226 See Lutheran Child.’s Friend Soc’y v. Haugk (In re Estate of Haugk), 280 N.W.2d
684, 690–91 (Wis. 1979).
227 Id. at 685–86.
228 Id. at 686.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 690.
231 Id.
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a third party revoke “at the testator’s direction.”232 If a clumsy person
drops a will into the sea or a wrongdoer annihilates the document in
secret, there has been no revocation. The reason for this sensible
outcome is simple: the testator never “direct[ed]” the individual to
revoke. It does not matter whether these acts take place inches from
the testator or miles away.
The best explanation for the presence doctrine in the revocation
setting is ritual. As the Kentucky Supreme Court put it, the rule
“induce[s] care and deliberation.”233 Indeed, forcing testators to
personally experience the destruction of the will might jolt them into
pondering the consequences of their choice. And it is possible that
they might be moved to reconsider their intent to revoke upon seeing
the lit blowtorch or the scissors hovering over the page.
Nevertheless, this meager virtue pales to the vices of the presence
requirement. Just as with the Wills Act and witnesses, testators and
parties to whom they have delegated the task of revocation are often
in the wrong place at the wrong time. 234 Surprisingly, many of these
cases involve people who ask their lawyers to revoke. 235 Consider Estate
of Boote. 236 Joseph Boote executed a codicil to his will that included his

232 Id. at 687; see also, e.g., Stainback v. West (In re Arbuckle’s Estate), 220 P.2d 950, 953
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (determining that a will was not revoked when the testator’ lawyer
destroyed it “in the absence of decedent, without her direction and without her knowledge
or consent”).
233 Miller v. Harrell, 194 S.W. 782, 785 (Ky. 1917).
234 See, e.g., In re Estate of Bancker, 232 So. 2d 431, 431 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970)
(refusing to find revocation when decedent’s family “went into another room, removed the
will from a wall safe and destroyed it by tearing it into pieces and flushing them down a
toilet”); Gross v. Gross (In re Estate of Gross), 144 So. 2d 861, 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962)
(holding that no revocation occurred when “[t]he original of the will was destroyed in
Birmingham, Alabama, by a person acting at the direction of the testator who was then in
Miami, Florida”); Miller, 194 S.W. at 785 (concluding that a third party’s destruction of the
will outside of the presence of the testator was ineffective even though the testator later
ratified the decision); In re Hughes’ Will, 114 N.Y.S. 929, 929 (Sur. Ct. 1908) (finding that
will remained valid when third parties mutilated the will outside of the testator’s presence);
Dower v. Seeds, 28 W. Va. 113, 138 (1886) (deciding that there was no revocation when the
will “was not burned in the room, where [the testator] was or had been, but in a different
room, in which no one was”).
235 See In re Estate of O’Donnell, 803 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Ark. 1991) (lawyer ripped the
will “into two pieces pursuant to the decedent’s directions which came over the
telephone”), overruled on other grounds by Edmundson v. Estate of Fountain, 189 S.W.3d 427
(Ark. 2004); Campbell v. Griefen (In re Mitchell’s Estate), 27 N.E.2d 606, 607 (Ill. App. Ct.
1940) (featuring a lawyer who threw away the testator’s will after receiving a letter from her
asking him to destroy it); In re Estate of Kraus, 385 N.Y.S.2d 933, 934 (Sur. Ct. 1976) (same);
cf. Harrison v. Bird, 621 So. 2d 972, 973 (Ala. 1993) (lawyer failed to revoke when he tore
will in his office not in the presence of the testator, but because he mailed the pieces to her
and they could not be found at her death, they were presumed revoked).
236 In re Estate of Boote, 198 S.W.3d 699 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
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new wife in addition to his kids. 237 His family learned about his choice
and began to squabble. 238 As a result, Joseph visited his counsel and
asked him to destroy the codicil. 239 The attorney explained that he
would need to retrieve the document from his office safe, but Joseph,
who was pressed for time, responded “[j]ust tear the damn thing up”
and left. 240 Later, the lawyer ran the codicil through a paper shredder. 241 A Tennessee appellate court held that the codicil remained
valid. 242 As the judges explained, the instrument had been “destroyed
‘by the testator’s direction’ but not ‘in the testator’s presence.’” 243
C. Equal Dignity
At first blush, the equal dignity principle seems to make sense. If
a testator must step inside the prophylactic bubble of the formalities
to make a will, then she should need to do the same to un-make a will.
This stance ensures that revocations boast all the virtues of the Wills
Act, from preserving the testator’s intent in writing to creating
witnesses who can testify about the document should a dispute arise. 244
Even in holograph jurisdictions, insisting that the revocation be in the
decedent’s handwriting provides valuable proof of authenticity.
Therefore, imposing the same norms on execution and revocation
gives the law a tidy symmetry.
But on closer inspection, the equal dignity principle glosses over
meaningful divergences between execution and revocation. For starters, the legal system needs to be especially sensitive to administrative
costs when formulating execution rules. After all, millions of wills pass
through probate courts each year. 245 Arguably, this tips the scales
toward requiring strict compliance with the execution formalities.246
See id. at 704.
Id. at 704–05.
Id. at 705.
Id.
Id. at 706.
See id. at 723–24.
Id. at 723 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-201(3) (2001) (current version at
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-201(3) (2021))).
244 See, e.g., In re McGill’s Will, 128 N.E. 194, 196 (N.Y. 1920) (opining that “[t]he
reason that exists for requiring that a will to be effective must be executed with certain
formalities exists to an equal extent for requiring that an instrument revoking a will to be
effective must be executed with like formalities”).
245 See John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2042 n.5 (1994) (reviewing
DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE JOHNSON & JOHNSON
FORTUNE (1993)).
246 See Peter Wendel, Testamentary Transfers and the Intent Versus Formalities Debate: The
Case for a “Charitable” Common Ground, 69 U. KAN. L. REV. 249, 270 (2020) (noting that this
concern has surfaced in the debate over harmless error).
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
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This bright line approach allows probate judges “to identify
documents as wills solely on the basis of readily ascertainable formal
criteria, thereby permitting probate to proceed in the vast majority of
cases as a routine, bureaucratic process.” 247 However, this concern is
not as pressing in the revocation context. Although every testator
makes a will, not every testator revokes a will. Thus, because revocation
issues arise less frequently, lawmakers could adopt a fact-sensitive test
for revoking by “will” without overburdening probate courts.
Moreover, one of the most frequently cited reasons for insisting
that testators strictly satisfy the Wills Act and holograph statutes—
discouraging wrongdoing—applies with less force to revocations.
Courts routinely justify their traditional zero-tolerance policy for
execution errors on the grounds that it “prevent[s] fraudulent or
unauthorized alterations or additions to the will.”248 But sham
instruments are a legitimate concern, in part, because they can benefit
anyone. Since American law gives property owners broad testamentary
freedom, there is no limit to the class of people who have the incentive
to forge a will. 249 Revocations are starkly different. The only people
who stand to profit from the annulment of a will are either the
decedent’s heirs (if she has no other will) or the beneficiaries of a prior
instrument. For this reason, deterring bogus revocations may not be
as important as deterring the creation of bogus wills.
D. Anti-Wills
Refusing to enforce anti-wills is absurd. Consider a New Mexico
appellate decision called Estate of Martinez. 250 Jose Martinez executed
a valid will that gave his land to two of his children. 251 Eleven years
later, he signed and had notarized a document entitled “Revo[c]ation
of Last Will and Testament,” which explained that he wanted to
“revok[e] a previous WILL which was executed approximately
[t]welve[] years ago [and] . . . named my daughter . . . as Personal

247 Mann, supra note 19, at 1036.
248 In re Brown’s Estate, 32 A.2d 22, 23 (Pa. 1943); see also In re Estate of Posey, 214
A.2d 713, 720 (N.J. Union County Ct. 1965), aff’d, 223 A.2d 38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1966) (“The basic purpose of the Wills Act is to provide safeguards ‘rigorously thrown about
the testamentary act in order to forestall frauds by the living upon the dead.’”) (quoting In
re Taylor’s Estate, 100 A.2d 346 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953)).
249 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 10.1 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2003) (stating that courts lack the “general authority to question
the wisdom, fairness, or reasonableness of the donor’s decisions about how to allocate his
or her property”).
250 Sanchez v. Martinez (In re Estate of Martinez), 985 P.2d 1230 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
251 See id. at 1231.
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Representative.” 252 The court held that the document was invalid
because it was not a “will”: it did not transmit property to anyone, and
it “would have taken effect immediately, not after the death of the
decedent.” 253
Notably, this approach does not serve any of the purposes of the
execution formalities. If Jose Martinez had added a clause to his
“Revo[c]ation of Last Will and Testament” giving $1 to his cousin, the
document would have blossomed into a valid “will” that revokes a
previous will. 254 But this additional clause would not have made
evidence of his intent to revoke clearer. It would not have increased
the probability that he was acting thoughtfully and voluntarily. And it
would not have made it easier for a probate court to administer his
estate. In fact, the equal dignity principle already ensures that antiwills fall into the green zone of reliability established by the Wills Act
and holograph statutes. Thus, demanding that a revocatory writing
take the additional step of conveying assets after death is arbitrary. 255
E. Words of Cancellation
Judicial hostility to enforcing words of cancellation comes from
two sources. The first is the language of revocation statutes. As noted,
the Statute of Frauds permitted revocation by “cancelling,” but the
Wills Act then omitted “cancelling” and added the catch-all “otherwise
destroying.”256 Some American lawmakers amended their revocation
legislation to match. 257 As a result, courts in these states interpreted
this change to mean that revocation by “cancellations” needed to be
252 Id.
253 Id. at 1232. The writing also failed the equal dignity principle because it was only
attested by one witness (the notary). See id. at 1233. Oddly, the court only mentions this
much more obvious reason not to enforce the revocation at the end of the opinion, in
passing. See id.
254 Of course, he would have also needed to obtain an additional witness’ signature. I
am ignoring that nuance because it does not factor into the court’s analysis.
255 As noted, courts that require anti-wills to distribute the testator’s assets rely heavily
on the text of their states’ narrow revocation statutes, which do not expressly permit a
“writing” that is not a “will” to operate as a revocation. See supra text accompanying note
171–75. But these judges fail to acknowledge that judges in other states with narrow
revocation statutes “have held that an instrument to be effective as a revocation need not
be effective as a will.” In re Heazle’s Estate, 240 P.2d 821, 823 (Idaho 1952) (collecting
cases).
256 See supra text accompanying notes 140–41.
257 See, e.g., Estate of Eglee, 383 A.2d 586, 588–89 (R.I. 1978) (“When the Legislature
amended the revocation statute in 1896, it deleted the words ‘cancelling’ and ‘obliterating’
and inserted the phrase ‘otherwise destroying.’”) (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS 1896, ch. 203,
§ 17 (current version at 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-5-10 (2021))); John B. Rees, Jr., American
Wills Statutes: II, 46 VA. L. REV. 856, 875–76 (1960) (noting that in the middle of the
twentieth century, several states “require[d] that the will be ‘destroyed’”).
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so pervasive that they effectively “destroyed” the document. 258 Second,
“cancel” was once a term of art. Today, it simply means “[t]o
terminate.” 259 But at common law, its definition was narrower. As the
Vermont Supreme Court explained in 1864, “cancellation” meant
crossing out a document’s words:
To draw cross lines over the face of a written instrument has been,
and is, a common mode of showing the intent, thereby, to make an
end of it as an instrument in force. In earlier times, when the ability
to write was possessed by very few, the great mass of persons of all
grades from the highest lord to the lowest peasant, could manifest
their intent, with pen and ink, only by unlettered marks. 260

For these two reasons, courts held that to “cancel” a will meant making
“marks or lines across the written parts of the instrument [and] . . . not
merely on blank parts of the paper.” 261
This miserly approach operates in tandem with the equal dignity
principle to achieve spectacular revocation failures. For example, in
Thompson v. Royall, M. Lou Bowen Kroll, who had executed a will and
a codicil, decided that she wanted to revoke both instruments. 262
Unfortunately, her lawyer convinced her to keep them as templates in
case she wanted to make a new will. 263 Thus, on the manuscript cover
of the will and again on the back of the codicil, the lawyer wrote: “This
will null and void and to be only held . . . as a memorandum for
another will . . . .”264 Kroll then signed both instruments. 265 The
Virginia Supreme Court observed that the sentence written by the
lawyer did not “physically affect the written portion of the will [or the

258 See, e.g., In re Glass’ Estate, 60 P. 186, 188 (Colo. App. 1900) (“[A] cancellation
would be . . . effective as such, if done with an intent to destroy an instrument . . . .” (emphasis
added)); Note, supra note 192, at 893 (“The English Wills Act requires that revocation by
act shall be by ‘burning, tearing, or otherwise destroying,’ and hence no cancellation or
obliteration can operate as such unless it amounts to a destruction of some part of the will.”)
(quoting Wills Act 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, § 20 (Eng., Wales & Ir.)).
259 Cancel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
260 Warner v. Warner’s Estate, 37 Vt. 356, 362 (1864); Dowling v. Gilliland, 122 N.E.
70, 72 (Ill. 1919) (citing a dictionary definition of “cancel” as “[t]o mark out or cut off, as
by the drawing of some letters across to signify that it is to be omitted; to blot or strike out,
as to cancel figures or writing” (quoting an unspecified dictionary)).
261 Thompson v. Royall, 175 S.E. 748, 750 (Va. 1934); see also Howard v. Hunter, 41 S.E.
638, 638 (Ga. 1902) (explaining that there is no revocation if the will remained “intact, and
no material part of the same [was] obliterated, written across, or canceled in any way”);
supra text accompanying notes 192–93.
262 175 S.E. at 748.
263 See id. at 748–49.
264 Id. at 749
265 Id.
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codicil].”266 Thus, it was not a revocation by the act of cancellation. 267
The state high court also reasoned that the inscriptions were not valid
anti-wills because they were neither in Kroll’s handwriting nor signed
by two witnesses. 268 Thus, although “[t]he proof established the
intention to revoke,” both the will and the codicil remained valid. 269
Likewise, in Kronauge v. Stoecklein, Helen White executed a will
that left her assets to Jennifer Jones. 270 Three years later, White
handwrote in the margin of the will: “This will is void. We have never
heard or seen Jennifer Jones or did she come to Jess’ funeral so I do
not leave her anything.”271 An Ohio appellate court admitted that
White’s desire to revoke her will “is not questioned,” but nevertheless
held that she had not achieved this goal because her notation neither
came into contact with the text of the will nor was attested. 272
Decisions like Thompson and Kronauge illustrate the perversity of
the majority approach to revoking by words of cancellation. If either
Kroll’s lawyer or White had written their respective sentences in a way
that touched a stray word or punctuation mark, then they would have
revoked by act. But that nuance does not illuminate the testator’s
wishes or assist courts in any way.
In fact, the law stacks the deck against words of cancellation even
though it serves the evidentiary, ritual, protective, and channeling
functions better than other ways of revoking by act. Indeed, like Kroll
and White, testators who try to revoke by words of cancellation often
explain why they wish to do so, which helps authenticate their wishes.
And words of cancellation are often either signed (as in Thompson) or
in the testator’s handwriting (like in Kronauge). Thus, they are far
more probative of the testator’s intent than drawing lines, tearing, or
burning the will, which “which can sometimes be ambiguous.”273
F. Electronic Wills
Industry-drafted electronic will revocation laws suffer from several
ambiguities and omissions. For starters, recall that they permit testators to invalidate e-wills by making them “unreadable.” 274 One flaw
266 Id. at 750.
267 See id. at 749–50.
268 See id. at 749.
269 Id. at 749–50.
270 293 N.E.2d 320 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972).
271 Id. at 321.
272 Id. at 321–22.
273 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1
reporter’s note 6 (AM. L. INST. 1999).
274 See supra text accompanying notes 199–202. In addition, Arizona, Florida, and
Nevada allow testators to revoke by canceling an e-will, but Indiana does not. It is too early
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with this test is that people often try to dispose of digital documents
through methods that do not make them inaccessible. Indeed, users
commonly drag icons into the “recycle bin” on their desktop, from
which they can be easily retrieved. 275 Thus, it is not clear that this
intuitive-seeming way to try to revoke a digital testamentary instrument
accomplishes anything. 276
Likewise, these statutes’ approach to copies is problematic. E-wills
are unique because they blur the distinction between originals and
non-originals that looms so large with paper wills. A testator might
have a copy of her e-will on her desktop, one in the cloud, another on
a removable drive, and no idea which one was generated first. To try
to solve this problem, Indiana requires individuals who have not
entrusted their wills to a custodian to delete “each copy . . . in [their]
possession or control.”277 Yet this creates the risk of that a single
overlooked file will doom a person’s wish to revoke. Conversely,
Arizona, Florida, and Nevada do not clarify whether a testator must
revoke an original. 278
The role of custodians further complicates matters. Most
consumers probably assume that they can revoke a will held by a
to tell which approach is preferable. Testators could reasonably believe that opening an
electronic will and typing “revoked” or some synonym would do the trick. However, unlike
paper wills, where testators often handwrite and sign or initial words of cancellation—thus
reinforcing their authenticity—font lacks the distinctiveness of penmanship. Accordingly,
permitting revocation by cancellation might create fertile ground for fraud.
275 See, e.g., Mayank Parmar, Microsoft is Working on a New Data Recovery Tool for Windows
10, WINDOWS LATEST (June 27, 2020), https://www.windowslatest.com/2020/06/27
/microsoft-is-working-on-a-new-data-recovery-tool-for-windows-10/
[https://perma.cc
/NF7D-FZ8Y].
276 In fact, even if a testator takes the extra precaution of emptying the recycle bin,
data recovery tools can dredge up deleted items. See, e.g., Tomiwa Onaleye, Do You Know
That Files Deleted from Your Recycle Bin Can Still be Recovered? Here Is How, TECHNEXT (Jul. 6,
2020), https://technext.ng/2020/07/06/do-you-know-that-files-deleted-from-your-recyclebin-can-still-be-recovered-here-is-how/ [https://perma.cc/57ZB-42XP]. Of course, it is
possible that a court might find that making an e-will temporarily unreadable is sufficient to
revoke it. But see IND. CODE § 29-1-21-8(c) (2021) (announcing that a testator must
“permanently delet[e] each copy of the electronic record associated with the electronic will
in the testator’s possession or control or . . . render[] the electronic record for the
associated electronic will unreadable and nonretrievable” (emphasis added)).
277 IND. CODE § 29-1-21-8(c) (2021) (emphasis added). This is a sharp departure from
the common law, which holds that “[t]he testator need not perform a revocatory act on all
the duplicates.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 4.1 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1999); see also UEWA, supra note 28, § 7 cmt. (Multiple Originals)
(“Although multiple copies of an electronic will may exist, a physical act performed on one
of them by the testator with the intent to revoke will be sufficient to revoke the will.”).
278 These statutes declare that testators can revoke through an act performed “on the
will.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2507(A)(2) (2021); see also FLA. STAT. § 732.506 (2021);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.120(2)(b) (2019). But it is not clear whether “the electronic will”
refers only to the first file generated or to copies of it.
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company by sending an email, calling customer service, or logging into
their account and pressing a button on a website. But this is not the
case. For one, as mentioned, in Arizona and Nevada, a custodian is
only bound by a directive “in a writing executed with the same
formalities required for the execution of an electronic will.”279 Thus,
anything short of a signed and witnessed writing does not suffice. Even
worse, Florida has no method for testators to inform custodians of
their intent to revoke. And because the Sunshine State continues to
require that a third party revoke in the testator’s presence, 280 annulling
an e-will held by a custodian would be close to impossible.
The UEWA’s revocation section attempts to float above these
complications. It merely states that a testator can revoke by act by
performing “a physical act.” 281 This amorphous standard essentially
delegates the task of rulemaking to courts. Unfortunately, though, the
model statute’s comments are internally inconsistent. In one breath,
the drafters contend that if an e-will is lodged with a custodian that
“provides a designated mechanism for revocation, such as a delete
button, and the testator intentionally pushes the button, the testator
has used a physical act.” 282 In the next breath, they assert that
“[s]ending an email that says, ‘I revoke my will,’ is not a physical act
performed on the will itself because the email is separate from the
will.”283 But the same logic should apply to the previous example of
pressing a delete button on a custodian’s webpage, which is also not “a
physical act performed on the will itself.” 284 Accordingly, it is unclear
whether testators can revoke through conduct that does not affect the
electronic document. 285
279 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2522(C) (2021); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.120(2)(a)
(2019). But see IND. CODE § 29-1-21-8(e) (2021) (only requiring that testators contact a
custodian to request revocation “in writing”).
280 See FLA. STAT. § 732.506 (2021).
281 UEWA, supra note 28, at § 7(b)(2); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-12-1507(2)(b) (repealed
2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-37-05(2)(b) (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1407(2)(b)
(West 2021); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.12.400–11.12.491 (2021).
282 UEWA, supra note 28, § 7 cmt. (Physical Act Revocation).
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 The UEWA’s comments also declare that a testator can revoke an e-will by an act
performed on a print-out of the underlying file. See id. This might be unwise. Recall that
when a will was last in the testator’s possession and cannot be found at her death, courts
presume that she revoked it. See supra text accompanying notes 164–68. As a result, under
the UEWA, any time a testator printed a copy of a digital will and then discarded it, there
would be a colorable revocation claim. See Hirsch, supra note 29, at 849 (“[A] testator might
well view the printout of an e-will as a copy for review and thus treat it carelessly . . . .”). For
Australian cases with dueling views on this subject, compare Mahlo v Hehir [2011] QSC 243
¶¶ 44–45 (19 Aug. 2011) (Austl.) (assuming that the presumption would apply in a case
where the testator printed a copy of a will but only the electronic file was located after she
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Although some revocation rules further the same evidentiary,
ritual, protective, and channeling functions as the execution formalities, others serve no objective. And yet these doctrines frequently
thwart a testator’s expectations. Accordingly, the next Part discusses
ways for courts and lawmakers to soften the blow of the revocation
formalities.
IV.

SOLUTIONS

This Part explores solutions to intent-defeating revocation rules.
It begins by examining two existing attempts to relax the high
formalism of revocation law: the constructive trust and the 1990 UPC
revisions. It demonstrates that even though these approaches are
superior to traditional revocation doctrine, they leave much to be
desired. Finally, this Part offers a novel solution to the revocation
conundrum: aligning will revocation with the rules that govern the
revocation of trusts.
A. Constructive Trusts
Some courts have tried to avoid unfair results in revocation cases
by imposing a constructive trust on inheritances that would be an
undeserved windfall. But as this section reveals, the constructive trust
is, at best, a partial solution to the problem of revocation formalism.
The constructive trust is an ancient equitable remedy. It is a legal
fiction that applies when someone has acquired property through
unfair means:
A constructive trust is one that arises by operation of law against
one who, by fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of
confidence, by commission of wrong, or by any form of
unconscionable conduct, artifice[,] concealment, or questionable
means, or who in any way against equity and good conscience,
either has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he
ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy. 286

To prevent unjust enrichment, courts deem the defendant to be a
trustee of the assets, forcing her “to convey [her] interest to another
died), with Yazbek v Yazbek [2012] NSWLR 594 ¶ 131 (1 June 2012) (Austl.) (reasoning that
testators “may feel more ready to discard a paper copy in circumstances where the
electronic one is retained” and that “[t]he unavailability of the paper copy is more likely to
be explained by such an attitude to electronic record keeping . . . than it is by an inference
that the document had been destroyed”).
286 In re Estate of Abernathy, 778 So. 2d 123, 126 (Miss. 2001) (citing Saulsberry v.
Saulsberry, 78 So. 2d 758, 760 (Miss. 1955)).
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to whom it justly belongs.” 287 Judges often invoke this mechanism in
cases involving breaches of contracts either to make or not to revoke a
will 288 and beneficiaries who murdered the decedent 289 or used fraud
or force to prevent her from changing her estate plan. 290
Likewise, some judges have used constructive trusts in failed
revocation cases. For example, in Gushwa v. Hunt, eighty-five-year-old
George Gushwa executed a will leaving his estate largely to his nieces
and nephews, not his longtime wife. 291 The husband of one of his
nieces, Ted Dale, retained the original. 292 But gradually, Gushwa
began to resent the fact that his relatives rarely called or visited, and so
he allegedly called Dale and requested the will so he could revoke it. 293
287 CARYL A. YZENBAARD, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, AND GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471, Westlaw (database updated June 2021); see also
Garrigus v. Viarengo, 963 A.2d 1065, 1075 (Conn. Ct. App. 2009) (“The issue raised by a
claim for a constructive trust is, in essence, whether a party has committed actual or
constructive fraud or whether he or she has been unjustly enriched.” (quoting Cadle Co. v.
Gabel, 794 A.2d 1029, 1040 (Conn. Ct. App. 2002))); Roscoe Pound, The Progress of the Law,
1918–1919 Equity, 33 HARV. L. REV. 420, 421 (1920) (explaining that in equity courts “one
of the most effective remedial expedients at [the judge’s] command was to treat a
defendant as if he were a trustee and put pressure upon his person to compel him to act
accordingly”).
288 See, e.g., Cowin v. Salmon, 13 So. 2d 190, 198 (Ala. 1943) (“A will as such is
revocable. But when it is the result of a contract on a valuable consideration, the revocation
of the will does not prevent the enforcement of a trust upon the basis of its obligation.”);
Stahmer v. Schley, 157 Cal. Rptr. 756, 758 (Ct. App. 1979) (citing Notten v. Mensing, 45
P.2d 198 (Cal. 1935)) (“[W]hen the testators have made a written agreement not to revoke,
and the agreement is supported by consideration, equity will enforce the agreement by
requiring the recipients of the estate to hold the property in constructive trust for the
intended beneficiaries.”); Jason Thomas King, Lifetime Remedies for Breach of a Contract to
Make a Will, 50 S.C. L. REV. 965, 971 (1999) (“If a promisor dies intestate, or without a will
conforming to the contract, equity will enforce the contract in the form of a constructive
trust against the testator’s heirs, ensuring the promisee receives what is deserved.”).
289 See, e.g., Kelley v. State, 196 A.2d 68, 69–70 (N.H. 1963) (reasoning that, in states
that do not bar a slayer from inheriting by statute, “a court applying common law
techniques can reach a sensible solution by charging the spouse, heir or legatee as a
constructive trustee of the property where equity and justice demand it”); John W. Wade,
Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another—A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715,
717 (1936) (observing that some jurisdictions have dealt with this conundrum by holding
“that title will pass to the slayer, but that equity will hold him a constructive trustee for the
heirs or next of kin of the decedent”).
290 See, e.g., Latham v. Father Divine, 85 N.E.2d 168, 171 (N.Y. 1949) (“The story is,
simply, that defendants by force and fraud, kept the testatrix from making a will in favor of
plaintiffs.”); White v. Mulvania, 575 S.W.2d 184, 190 (Mo. 1978) (“[I]f the testatrix were
fraudulently prevented from changing her will in favor of the plaintiffs due to the fraud, . . .
then the property which devolves to the grandchildren solely as a result of this fraud must
be held by them in a constructive trust for the plaintiffs.” (emphasis omitted)).
291 197 P.3d 1, 2 (N.M. 2008).
292 Id. Dale and his wife were not beneficiaries. See id.
293 See id.
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Dale responded by sending Gushwa a partial photocopy of the
document. 294 Gushwa then hired a lawyer, who told him to take
elaborate measures to cancel the instrument:
[H]is new lawyer assisted him in drafting a document entitled
“Revocation of Missing Will(s),” in which Decedent repeatedly
stated that he wanted to revoke his previous Will. At the same time,
on the advice of counsel Decedent wrote “Revoked” on the copy of
three pages of the Will . . . and attached those pages to the
Revocation of Missing Will(s) document. That document was
signed by Decedent and two witnesses and was notarized. 295

The New Mexico Supreme Court held that this document was not a
revocation. 296 For starters, Gushwa’s defacement of the Xerox was
invalid under the copy rule. 297 Moreover, because New Mexico did not
recognize anti-wills at the time, Gushwa’s signed, witnessed, and
notarized declaration of intent to revoke was meaningless. 298 However,
the court acknowledged that Gushwa’s wife might be entitled to a
constructive trust over the assets she would have received in the
absence of the will. 299 The court remanded the case for the trial court
to decide whether Dale “wrongfully prevented [Gushwa] from
obtaining the original Will, thereby making it virtually impossible for
[him] to comply with the statutory requirements for revocation.”300
Similarly, in Estate of Tolin, Alexander Tolin told his neighbor,
who was a retired lawyer, that he wished to revoke a codicil that named
294 See id.
295 Id.
296 See id. at 3–4.
297 See id. at 6–7.
298 See id. at 3–5. As noted above, New Mexico has since amended its revocation statute
to recognize anti-wills. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
299 See Gushwa, 197 P.3d at 7.
300 Id. Likewise, as mentioned, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
heirs often claimed that a beneficiary had tricked the testator into believing that her will
had been destroyed. See supra text accompanying notes 126–30. Although courts refused
to find that these instruments had been revoked, some held that the allegations, if proven,
would entitle the heir to a constructive trust. See, e.g., Brazil v. Silva, 185 P. 174, 177–78
(Cal. 1919), disapproved of on other grounds by Ludwicki v. Guerin, 367 P.2d 415 (Cal. 1961)
(holding that plaintiff could pursue cause of action for constructive trust when the testator’s
wife had supposedly burnt an envelope that she falsely said contained the will); In re
McCloskey’s Estate, 6 Pa. D. & C.2d 97, 97–98, 107 (Pa. Orphans’ Ct. 1956) (acknowledging
the possibility that a constructive trust might arise from allegations “that decedent’s sister,
who is the proponent and sole beneficiary of the will, falsely represented to decedent that
his will in her possession had been destroyed in a fire and that decedent relied thereon”);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 184 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 1937) (“Where a testator
is by fraud, duress or undue influence prevented from revoking his will, or from revoking a
devise or bequest, by the person who takes the property under the will, he holds it upon a
constructive trust for the person who would have taken if the will or devise or bequest had
been revoked.”).
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a charity, Broward Art Guild, as the residuary beneficiary. 301 The
neighbor advised Tolin to destroy the codicil.302 In front of the
neighbor, Tolin tore up a document that he believed was the codicil
but was actually a high-quality photocopy of it. 303 The Florida Supreme
Court first applied the copy rule and determined that Tolin had failed
to revoke the codicil. 304 But then, observing that even Broward Art
Guild admitted that Tolin had ripped up the codicil thinking that it
was the original, the court “f[ou]nd that a constructive trust is
appropriate under these unique and undisputed facts.” 305
Despite opinions like Gushwa and Tolin, the constructive trust is
no panacea. First, some courts refuse to employ the remedy in
revocation cases on the grounds that doing so would be an improper
end-run around the revocation formalities. 306 As the Ohio Supreme
Court opined, the Statute of Frauds was “designed to prevent the
frauds and perjuries arising out of mere parol revocations, and to
sanction a recovery . . . would open the door for the very evils which
the [S]tatute intended to exclude.” 307 Accordingly, in some states, the
constructive trust is a non-starter.
Second, even in states that are willing to use the tool, a
constructive trust is “not appropriate where there is an error in the
execution of [a] document.” 308 For example, Florida courts have
refused to extend Tolin to cases in which decedents failed to sign a will
or obtain the proper witnesses. Thus, constructive trusts likely cannot
provide relief when a testator tries to create an anti-will but does not
comply with the Wills Act or a holograph statute.

301 In re Estate of Tolin, 622 So. 2d 988, 989 (Fla. 1993).
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 See id. at 990.
305 Id. at 991.
306 See, e.g., Kent v. Mahaffey, 10 Ohio St. 204, 220 (1859) (“[T]o hold the legatee a
trustee in such case would seem to nullify the statute prohibiting revocations except in a
specified manner.”); In re Evans’ Will, 98 N.Y.S. 1042, 1044 (N.Y. App. Div. 1906)
(“Legislative limitations or omissions do not constitute a court as a curative Legislature.”);
cf. Reiter v. Carroll, 198 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Ark. 1946) (declining to impose a constructive
trust when the plaintiffs merely proved that the testator “instructed the appellee to destroy
the will, and that the appellee [falsely] told him that the will had been destroyed”). In
addition, in some states, probate courts lack the power to adjudicate causes of action that
seek a constructive trust. See, e.g., Graham v. Birch, 49 N.W. 697, 699 (Minn. 1891) (refusing
to entertain constructive trust argument on appeal from probate court that lacked
jurisdiction over the matter).
307 Kent, 10 Ohio St. at 221.
308 Kelly v. Lindenau, 223 So. 3d 1074, 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017); see Allen v. Dalk,
826 So. 2d 245, 248 (Fla. 2002) (refusing to impose a constructive trust when the decedent
failed to sign the will).
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Third, a plaintiff who seeks a constructive trust must carry a heavy
burden. Indeed, “the proof must be so clear, convincing, strong, and
unequivocal as to lead to one conclusion.” 309 Even strong evidence
that a testator intended to revoke may be insufficient. For instance, in
Davis v. Howard, Olive Davis executed a will that left $1 to her daughter
and everything else to her son. 310 Davis then mailed the will to her
son. 311 Decades later, she wrote to her son and asked him to revoke
the lopsided document, saying “I can’t have that bitterness now. Time
is too short.” 312 However, the son did not destroy the will. 313 The
Oregon Supreme Court held that these facts were not sufficiently
egregious to warrant making the son a constructive trustee for the
daughter’s benefit. 314 Thus, the constructive trust only provides partial
relief for the ruthless revocation formalities.
B. The UPC
The 1990 UPC also attempted to de-formalize revocation law.
Unfortunately, it only took modest steps in this direction.
The 1990 UPC revisions tried to liberalize revocation doctrine in
two ways. First, the drafters reformed the test for revoking by writing
words of cancellation. Recall that when the testator writes “void” or
“revoked” on the will, most courts only deem the language to be a
cancellation if it overlaps with the text of the will. 315 Section 2-507 of
the 1990 UPC abolishes that nuance by providing that a revocatory act
is effective “whether or not [it] . . . touched any of the words on the
will.”316 Second, although the UPC’s harmless error rule primarily
targets will execution, it also spills over into the realm of revocation.
Indeed, the doctrine allows courts to enforce failed attempts to
execute not only wills, but also anti-wills:
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not
executed in compliance with [the execution formalities], the
document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in
compliance with [the execution formalities] if the proponent of the
document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence

309 Kurtz v. Solomon, 656 N.E.2d 184, 191 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (citing Suttles v. Vogel,
533 N.E.2d 901, 905 (Ill. 1988)).
310 527 P.2d 422, 423 (Or. Ct. App. 1974).
311 See id.
312 Id.
313 See id. To be fair, the son testified that he told Davis “that he could not change the
will and that if she wanted it changed she would have to write another will” and that she
“neither asked him to destroy the will nor asked him to mail the will to her.” Id.
314 See id. at 424.
315 See supra subsection II.B.3.
316 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-507(a)(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019).
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that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute
(i) the decedent’s will[ or] (ii) a partial or complete revocation of the
will . . . . 317

These curative measures are major upgrades. For example, unlike
conventional law, the UPC’s approach to revocation by act would
validate words of cancellation written in the margins or a blank part of
the will. As noted above, there is rarely doubt that words of
cancellation are authentic because they tend to be both in the
testator’s handwriting and to explain the reason for the testator’s
actions. 318 In fact, harmless error could even resuscitate written words
of cancellation that appear on another document, rather than the will.
Indeed, the rule applies to “a document”—that is, any document—
that the testator intended to be “a . . . revocation of the will.”319 Finally,
harmless error would excuse garden variety execution defects in antiwills, such as the testator’s failure to sign or acknowledge the anti-will
in front of two witnesses who were present at the same time.
But the UPC’s approach does not go far enough. The most
revolutionary of the UPC’s changes—harmless error—excludes many
botched revocations by act. Indeed, because the rule only governs a
faulty “document or writing,” it excludes deficient attempts to revoke
by burning, tearing, and obliterating. 320 For example, harmless error
could not cure a would-be revocation that violates the copy rule or the
presence requirement. 321 Thus, if someone torches a copy of her will

317 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019) (emphasis added).
318 See supra text accompanying note 272.
319 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503.
320 Moreover, there is a disconnect between harmless error’s remedy and revocation
by act. When harmless error applies, it compels the probate judge to treat the “document
or writing . . . as if it had been executed in compliance with” the Wills Act formalities. UNIF.
PROB. CODE § 2-503. But a revocation by act never even tries to satisfy the Wills Act
formalities. Instead, it is governed by the revocation formalities. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2507. Thus, it would make no sense to deem a failed attempt to revoke by act as a valid
writing under the Wills Act.
321 Some Australian states have also adopted a forward-looking harmless error rule for
revocations. They treat a will as revoked if the “the testator . . . or another person in the
testator’s presence and at the testator’s direction . . . deal[t] with the will in such a manner
that the [c]ourt is satisfied from the state of the will that the testator intended to revoke it.”
Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 13(f); Succession Act 2006 (NSW) pt 2.1 div 5 s 11; Succession Act 1981
(Qld) pt 2 s 13(e)(ii); Wills Act 2008 (Tas) pt 2 div 3 s 15; Wills Act 1997 (Vic) div 5
s 12(2)(g). This doctrine allows judges to deem acts other than burning, canceling, tearing,
obliterating, or destroying to be revocations. However, like American harmless error, it also
retains the presence requirement and the copy rule. See In re Estate of Miruzzi [2018]
NSWSC 1899 ¶ 58 (defending the copy rule on the grounds that “[i]n an age of widespread,
high-quality reproduction of documents by mechanical or electronic means, . . . a testator’s
testamentary intentions [would be] at risk of challenge if ever any form of copy were to be
observed ‘destroyed’”).
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or hears her lawyer destroy the instrument over the telephone,
harmless error cannot help. 322
C. Importing Trust Formalities
The core requirements for revoking a will are nearly 350 years old.
This section urges lawmakers to reimagine these formalities by
replacing them with the pliable rules that govern the revocation of a
trust.
Recall that the popularity of trusts has been one of the catalysts
for the liberalization of the law of will execution. 323 Because trusts
convey billions of dollars every year but do not need to be attested by
two witnesses or entirely handwritten, they have helped convince some
scholars and lawmakers that the Wills Act and holograph statutes are
overkill. 324
Likewise, trust law’s approach to revocation is light-years ahead of
wills law. Settlors usually do not need to satisfy rigid mandates. Instead, trust revocation formalities are two-tiered. First, as a general
principle, individuals can rescind a trust “in any way that provides clear
and convincing evidence of the[ir] . . . intention to do so.” 325 Second,
people who prefer to narrow the permissible methods of revocation
enjoy the freedom to grant themselves “a power to revoke . . . by
322 The comments to the Restatement (Third) of Property suggests that this is not the case
by providing the following example of the harmless error rule in action:
G’s will was in the possession of her executor, a neighbor. G telephoned the
executor at home and told him to tear up her will. The executor retrieved the
will from his desk and tore it up. . . . If G’s intent to revoke is proved by clear and
convincing evidence, . . . the failure to perform the act in G’s conscious presence
may be a harmless error that can be excused . . . .
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. l illus. 9
(AM. L. INST. 1999). Although I agree that this should be the law, for the reasons stated
above in the text accompanying notes 319–320, it is currently not the law.
323 See supra text accompanying notes 83–87.
324 Id.
325 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63(3) (AM. L. INST. 2003); see also ARK. CODE
ANN. § 28-73-602(c)(2)(B) (2021); FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(3)(b)(2) (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 58a-602(c)(2)(B) (2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386B.6-020(3)(b)(2) (West 2020); ME.
STAT. tit. 18-B, § 602(3)(B)(2) (2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-14-02(3) (2021); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 35-15-602(c)(2)(B) (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-605(3)(b)(ii) (West 2021); WIS.
STAT. § 701.0602(3)(b)(2) (2021); cf. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5806.02(C) (West 2021)
(adding the caveat that unless a trust expressly provides otherwise, “a revocable trust may
not be revoked or amended by a will or codicil”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7602(3)(b)(i)
(2021) (only allowing written trusts to be revoked “by another writing manifesting clear and
convincing evidence of the settlor’s intent to revoke”); MINN. STAT. § 501C.0602(c)(2)(i)(ii) (2021) (same). Other states follow a more restrictive approach that only allows a settlor
to revoke a written trust by “a later written instrument delivered to the trustee.” ALA. CODE
§ 19-3B-602(c)(2)(B) (2021).
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[following] a particular procedure.”326 For example, settlors often
provide that they can revoke the instrument by delivering a signed
writing to the trustee. 327
Extending this flexibility to testators would be an improvement in
several ways. For one, it would liberate them from the straitjacket of
the revocation formalities. As we have seen, near-miss revocations are
endemic: people routinely disfigure copies of their wills, 328 have third
parties who are not present destroy the document, 329 write words of
cancellation in the margins, 330 and fail to satisfy the equal dignity principle. 331 But in virtually all these cases, there is clear and convincing
evidence of what the testator sought to accomplish. Thus, adopting
the lenient standard from trust law would change these harsh
outcomes.
Moreover, this approach would pay dividends in the context of
electronic wills. For starters, it would harmonize revocation principles
for paper and digital wills. As noted, lawmakers have promulgated
unique rules for the rescission of e-wills, which makes an already
byzantine area of law even more convoluted. 332 By contrast, trust
revocation rules offer a one-size-fits-all rubric that would reduce
confusion. Likewise, as I have argued, industry-drafted statutes make
revoking an e-will too difficult. 333 Deleting them and using loose rules
from trust law would prevent the cruel history of revocation formalism
from repeating itself in this brave new world.
326 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 cmt. i (AM. L. INST. 2003); MARY F.
RADFORD, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, AND GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 1000, Westlaw (database updated June 2021) (“The settlor may make
provision for the method by which a power of revocation or termination is to be exercised
and such a provision must be followed.”); ALA. CODE § 19-3B-602(c) (2021) (“The settlor
may revoke . . . by substantial compliance with a method provided in the terms of the
trust . . . .”); accord ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-602(c)(1) (2021); FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(3)(a)
(2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-602(c)(1) (2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386B.6-020(3)(a)
(West 2021); ME. STAT. tit. 18-B, § 602(3)(A) (2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7602(3)(a)
(2021); MINN. STAT. § 501C.0602(c)(1) (2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5806.02(C) (West
2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-14-02(3) (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-602(c)(1) (2021);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-605(3)(a) (West 2021); WIS. STAT. § 701.0602(3)(a) (2021).
327 See, e.g., 3 JEFFREY H. TIERMAN, CALIFORNIA TRANSACTIONS FORMS: ESTATE
PLANNING § 13:46 n., Westlaw (database updated June 2021) (observing that “[t]his form
is common in most trusts”); Schlossberg v. Estate of Kaporovsky, 303 So. 3d 982, 986 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that deed conveying condo qualified as “an instrument in
writing delivered to the trustees”); Thompson v. Waukesha State Bank, 510 F. Supp. 2d 453,
460 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (featuring a settlor who revoked through this mechanism).
328 See supra text accompanying notes 1–4, 216–18, 291–305.
329 See supra text accompanying notes 225–30, 234–43.
330 See supra text accompanying notes 5–8, 262–72.
331 See supra text accompanying notes 134–37, 262–72.
332 See supra subsection II.B.4.
333 See supra text accompanying notes 274–80.
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Admittedly, like any dilution of testamentary formalities, this
change could sow doubt about a testator’s intent and undermine the
channeling function. For one, the clear and convincing evidence test
might raise tough line-drawing questions. Testators sometimes deal
with their wills in ways that are ambiguous, such as crumpling them up
and “dropp[ing] them in the waste basket” 334 or “placing [them] . . .
in a paper sack with other items of trash.”335 Similarly, some people
allegedly try to revoke their wills through oral statements. 336 Say what
you will about current revocation law, but it makes these into easy
cases. Conversely, my thesis would force courts to wade into the factual
record.
But trust law also offers a way around this morass. As mentioned,
settlors can create private formalities. 337 As a result, my proposal would
also accommodate testators who want more protection against
fraudulent revocations. For example, cautious testators could expressly preclude revocation by act or specify that a revocatory writing
would need to have five witnesses. 338 In fact, authorizing private will
revocation formalities would be fitting. As mentioned, the original
revocatory acts in the Statute of Frauds were crowdsourced: Parliament
chose “burning[,] cancelling[,] teareing [sic,] or obliterating the
[will]” because that was how most testators showcased their desire to
revoke. 339 Thus, at a time when wills law is in flux, it would make sense
to once again democratize the issue. 340
334 Gassman v. Stanton (In re Estate of Stanton), 472 N.W.2d 741, 746 (N.D. 1991).
335 SouthTrust Bank of Ala. v. Winter, 689 So. 2d 69, 71 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
336 See, e.g., Milbourne v. Milbourne, 799 S.E.2d 785, 792 (Ga. 2017).
337 See supra text accompanying notes 325–26.
338 Apparently, some testators already try to personalize the revocation formalities. See,
e.g., Generic Probate Pleading at 3, Estate of McAdam, No. PES-14-298205 (Cal. Super. Ct.
filed Oct. 28, 2014) (“I do hereby declare that I will not at any time revoke this Will except
by a later Will . . . or by the destruction of both copies [of the Will].”).
339 See supra text accompanying notes 122, 127–28.
340 Admittedly, private formalities could also muddy the waters about a testator’s
wishes. There has been a steady stream of litigation over whether a settlor meant a
procedure to be the exclusive way to revoke a trust. See, e.g., Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde, 265
Cal. Rptr. 3d 254, 261–65 (Ct. App. 2020) (surveying California caselaw); Barlow v. Olguin
(In re Estate of Schlicht), 329 P.3d 733, 737 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (upholding a revocation
when “the settlor’s trust provided a method to revoke the trust’s provisions, but that method
was not expressly stated to be the exclusive method of revocation”); Warne v. Warne, 275
P.3d 238, 248 (Utah 2012) (same for partial revocation of a particular beneficiary’s
interest). Thus, lawmakers and courts would need to provide guidance on how to
distinguish a will that merely gives the testator the option to follow a unique revocatory
method from one that displaces all other revocation rules. In addition, wills are already
laden with boilerplate that testators do not read and could not understand. See Reid Kress
Weisbord & David Horton, Boilerplate and Default Rules in Wills Law: An Empirical Analysis,
103 IOWA L. REV. 663, 668 (2018) (examining 230 wills from Sussex County, New Jersey,
and finding that they often used “language that sounds authoritative, but makes little sense
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CONCLUSION
Unlike the requirements for making a valid will, the revocation
formalities have never received sustained attention. This Article has
tried to remedy this omission. It has demonstrated that these finicky
rules routinely frustrate a testator’s wishes and yet do not always serve
demonstrable policy objectives. Lawmakers should abandon them,
adopt principles of revocation from the field of trusts, and thus bring
will revocation into the twenty-first century.

in context”); David Horton & Reid Kress Weisbord, Boilerplate No Contest Clauses, 82 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2019, at 69 (2019) (reaching similar conclusions about no contest
clauses in a study of 457 wills from Alameda County, California). If private revocation rules
in wills also devolve into legalese, they are unlikely to improve outcomes.
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